STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 135 



things. This infinitely complex mass of relations, which 

 it is impossible for us to reduce to perfect order and 

 simplicity, is our confused perception. Confused percep- 

 tion is, then, the representation in us not of our own 

 nature, but of the system of things other than ourselves, 

 that is to say, the other Monads as they are related to us. 

 But distinct perception is the representation or perception 

 of our own nature, of that which is in ourselves, and it is 

 at the same time the evolving of some of our confused 

 perceptions into clearness ; it is not something quite 

 separate from our confused perception. Thus we rise to 

 a knowledge of ourselves through our knowledge of 

 external things 1 . Self- consciousness implies the con- 

 sciousness of objects ; apperception is, indeed, the very 

 flower of perception, the beauty to produce which per- 

 ception, in all its degrees, is living and growing. In 

 experience or confused thought, rightly interpreted, there 

 is the basis of distinct, rational knowledge. Sense, 

 experience, imagination, must not be derided as fiction- 

 makers by the intellect which they have nourished 2 . 



The Meaning which Leibniz attaches to 'Perception' or 

 'Representation.' How does he endeavour to avoid an 

 endless Relativity ? 



Something remains to be said as to the meaning of this 

 'perception,' 'representation,' or 'expression,' which is 

 the key-word to Leibniz's theory of knowledge. There is 

 a strong suggestion of petitio principii about it. What 

 exactly does it mean ? What is perceived, represented, 

 expressed? And what does the perception, representation, 

 expression consist in ? If the essence of every real sub- 



1 Cf. Nouveaux Essais, bk. ii. ch. 21, 73 (E. 269 b ; G. v. 197) : 

 'The senses furnish us with material for reflexion, and we should 

 never even think of thought, if we did not think of something 

 else, that is to say, of the particular things with which the senses 

 furnish us. And I am persuaded that souls and created spirits are 

 never without organs and never without sensations, as they cannot 

 reason without symbols.' 



2 See Appendix D, p. 206. 



