STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 137 



Thus pure thought cannot symbolize, represent, or per- 

 ceive that which is absolutely not-thought. Confused 

 thought is the symbol both of other confused thought and 

 of clear and distinct thought. Accordingly, as between 

 confused thoughts the relation of sign and thing signified 

 is such that that which is now regarded as sign may from 

 another point of view be taken as the thing signified, and 

 vice versa. Nevertheless it is evident that the clearer^ 

 and more distinct of any two corresponding perceptions \ 

 will naturally be regarded as the thing signified by the j 

 more confused perception, that is to say, the thing which 

 the more confused perception is trying to express, but is 

 unable to express adequately. And thus the ultimate 

 ' thing signified,' the fundamental reality, which all other 

 perceptions in various degrees symbolize or represent, 

 must be perfectly clear and distinct thought, or, in other 

 words, the thought of God. So also God is First .Cause as" 

 welljasJJltimate Beality. For we have already seen l that 

 cause is always reason or explanation, the relatively clear 

 and distinct perception as against the corresponding con- 

 fused perception, which is the effect. Accordingly, as the 

 nature of God is absolutely clear and distinct perception, 

 He must be the Ultimate Cause of all things 2 . 



(&) ETHICS. 



Degrees of Appetition in the Monads Impulse, Instinctive 

 Desire, Will 



Every Monad has appetition as well as perception. 

 Appetition is the principle of change in the Monad, that 



* l pp. 106, 107. 



2 This seems to imply that God is the ultimate reality of whom 

 all individual created things are modes or manifestations. But 

 Leibniz endeavours to avoid such a conclusion as this, by main- 

 taining that the essences of things are independent ideas in the 

 mind and understanding of God, eternal truths whose nature is 

 not subject to His will. It is hardly necessary to point out how 

 unsatisfactory is this explanation ; but it is manifest that the 

 weakness of Leibniz's theory at this point is the inevitable conse- 

 quence of his attempt to work with two first principles, the 

 mutual relations of which he has not thoroughly thought out. 



