138 INTRODUCTION 



in virtue of which the Monad passes from one perception 

 to another. Like perception it has an infinite series of 

 degrees ; but three main varieties of it may be noted, 

 corresponding to the three main varieties of perception. 

 Thus the appetition of the lowest class of Monads (the 

 bare Monads) is mere unconscious impulse or tendency, 

 a potential blind force tending to become actual. It is 

 the particular appetition or change of perception (repre- 

 sentation) which has its source or ground in unconscious 

 perceptions. This bare impulse may 'be compared to a 

 watch-spring wound up, which tends to unwind itself ' ; 

 it is a tendency such as that of l the stone which goes by 

 the most direct but not always the best way towards the 

 centre of the earth 2 .' The appetition of animal souls is 

 instinctive appetite or desire, which proceeds from feeling 

 or conscious, yet relatively confused, perceptions. Like 

 the appetition of the bare Monads, it seeks immediate 

 present satisfaction, having nothing to guide it but the 

 consciousness and memory of the animal soul. Finally, 

 the appetition of rational souls is self-conscious desire or 

 will, a principle of change whose basis is apperception or 

 clear and distinct rational knowledge 3 . Appetition, like 

 perception, is one and the same throughout all its degrees 

 and varieties, from bare force to the freest, most rational 

 volition. And in the nature of man we find all degrees 

 of it ; he is not a purely rational will, but has instinctive 

 impulses and passions, which belong to the middle class 

 of appetitions, and physical powers which belong to the 



1 Nouveaux Essais, bk. ii. ch. 20, 6 (E. 248 b ; G. v. 152, 153). 



2 Ibid. bk. ii. ch. 21, 36 (E. 259 a ; G. v. 175). 



3 Cf. ibid. bk. ii. ch. 21, 42 (E. 261 b ; G. v. 180) : ' There are 

 unfelt [insensible] inclinations, of which we have no consciousness 

 [apperception] ; there are felt [sensible] inclinations, whose existence 

 and object we know, but which are formed without our being 

 aware of it, and these are confused inclinations, which we attribute 

 to the body, although there is always in the mind something cor- 

 responding to them ; and finally, there are distinct inclinations 

 which reason gives us, and of whose force and formation we are 

 aware.' 



