STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 141 



desire 1 . This uneasiness is not exactly pleasure or pain, 

 but a vague feeling of discomfort or restlessness, that 

 tends to pass into more definite desire and so to produce 

 action. It is thus for Leibniz the confused perception 

 and undeveloped striving or appetition out of which, by 

 a process of evolution, clear and distinct perception and 

 free volition arise. In so far as this evolution is re- 

 strained, we suffer pain : in so far as it proceeds smoothly 

 without impediment, we enjoy pleasure. Thus every soul 

 instinctively seeks its own pleasure: it follows the line 

 of least resistance. This it does in virtue of its own 

 nature, which is to unfold itself spontaneously from 

 within, its present state flowing entirely from its past 

 and holding a prophecy of its future. Soul-activity is 

 pleasure, soul-restraint is pain ; and it is of the essence 

 of the soul to be active, for every simple substance is 

 primarily a force. 



Freedom, Liberty of Indifference, and the i Will to will.' 



From this Leibniz's view of freedom directly follows. 

 There can be no such thing as a liberty of indifference, 

 an absolutely undetermined choice ; for that would imply 

 discontinuity in the life of the soul. An absolutely un- 

 determined choice can only mean that the state of the 

 soul when it makes the choice is not an orderly unfolding 

 of the state of the soul preceding the choice, but is a 

 beginning of action de novo. And this is contrary to the 



1 Nouveaux Essais, bk. ii. ch. 20, 6 (E. 247 ; G. v. 150). Cf. 

 ch. 21, 36 (E. 258 b ; G. v. 174) : 'If you consider your "un- 

 easiness " as a real discomfort [deplaisir], I do not admit that in this 

 sense it is the sole goad to action. Most frequently the goad is 

 those little unfelt [insensible] perceptions, which we might call im- 

 perceptible [inaperceptible~] pains, were it not that the notion of pain 

 implies apperception. These little impulses consist in the continual 

 freeing of ourselves from little hindrances, at which our nature 

 works without thinking about it. In this really consists that un- 

 easiness, which we feel without knowing it, which makes us act in 

 passion as well as when we appear most tranquil, for we are never 

 without some activity and motion, which comes merely from this, 

 that nature is always working so as to put herself more at ease.' 



