142 INTRODUCTION 



very notion of substance. Both in the TJieodicee and in 

 the Nouveaux Essais, Leibniz freely illustrates his view 

 by reference to particular instances, such as the parable 

 of the ass between two equal bundles of hay ; and he 

 makes it evident that, as a matter of fact, in every case 

 there is in the state of the soul before the choice is made 

 some determining element of perception. The extreme 

 case, of course, is that of 'willing to will,' resolving to do 

 a thing contrary to our judgment and wishes, merely 

 because we have the power to do it. Leibniz points out 

 that even here our volition is determined by a previous 

 idea, namely that of showing to ourselves or to others 

 that we possess a certain power 1 , so that in every case 



1 Cf. Nouveaux Essais, bk. ii. eh. 21, 25 (E. 255 b ; G. v. 168) : 

 'Men say that, after having known and considered everything, it 

 is still in their power to will, not only what pleases them most, 

 but also the opposite of that, just to show their freedom. But it is 

 to be noticed that this very caprice or obstinacy or, to say the least, 

 this reason which prevents from obeying other reasons, also comes 

 into the balance and makes pleasing to them that which otherwise 

 would not please them at all, and accordingly their choice is 

 always determined by perception. Thus we do not will merely 

 what we will, but what pleases us, although the will may indirectly 

 and, as it were, from afar contribute to make a thing pleasing to 

 us or not.' See also the corresponding passage in Locke's Essay 

 (^bk. ii. ch. 21, 24), Eraser's ed., vol. i. p. 327. 



A hint of Leibniz's psychology of volition is given in the 

 Nouveaux Essais, bk. ii. ch. 2.1, 39 (E. 260 b ; G. v. 178) : 'Several 

 perceptions and inclinations conspire towards complete volition, 

 which is the result of their conflict. There are perceptions and 

 inclinations which are individually imperceptible, but the totality 

 of which produces an uneasiness, which impels us without our 

 seeing the ground of it ; several of these perceptions combined 

 together, direct us towards some object or away from it, and then 

 we have desire or fear, also accompanied by an uneasiness, but an 

 uneasiness which does not always amount to pleasure or pain 

 \_deplaisir]. Finally there are impulses actually accompanied by 

 pleasure and pain, and all these perceptions are either new 

 sensations or images remaining from some past sensation, accom- 

 panied or unaccompanied by memory which renews the attractions 

 these same images had in these preceding sensations, and so 

 renews the old impulses in proportion to the vivacity of the imagi- 

 nation. From all these impulses there finally results the prevailing 

 effort, which constitutes the full volition. Yet the desires and 

 tendencies of which we are conscious are also frequently called 

 volitions (although less complete') whether or not they prevail and 



