STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 143 



the will is determined by some reason or perception. 

 The error of abstract indeterminism arises from neglect 

 of sub-conscious perceptions and appetitions. It is thus 

 akin to the error of Descartes and Locke with regard to 

 knowledge, namely that of regarding only self-conscious 

 knowledge or apperception as real knowledge. We have 

 seen 1 that to regard all thought as self-conscious or reflec- 

 tive would make any progress in thought impossible, 

 because it would imply that the mind thinks that it thinks 

 that it thinks ad infinitum, and is accordingly never able 

 to go on to any new thought. Similarly, the doctrine of 

 a liberty of indifference, regarding all volition as neces- 

 sarily developed and conscious, implies a power of willing 

 to will that we will ad infinitum. But in fact volition 

 cannot be restricted to deliberate conscious desire or 

 intention. We do and experience many things which 

 ultimately contribute to determine our will, although we 



give rise to action. It thus readily follows, that volition can 

 hardly exist without desire and avoidance \_fuite] ; for I think we may 

 give this name to the opposite of desire. There is uneasiness not 

 only in the troublesome passions, like hate, cruelty, anger, envy, 

 shame, but also in their opposites, such as love, hope, favour and 

 glory. It may be said that wherever there is desire, there is 

 uneasiness ; but the contrary is not always true, because often we 

 have uneasiness without knowing what we want, and then there 

 is no definite desire. ... As the final determination [to action] is 

 the result of weighing, I should think it may happen that the 

 most pressing uneasiness does not prevail [in influencing the will] ; 

 for even though it might prevail over each of the opposite 

 tendencies, taken singly, it may be that the others, combined 

 together, overcome it. The mind may even make use of the 

 method of dichotomy to make now one and now another set of 

 tendencies prevail, as in an assembly we can make one or another 

 party prevail by a majority of votes, according to the order in 

 which we put the questions. It is true that the mind ought to 

 make provision for this beforehand ; for at the moment of struggle 

 there is no time for these artifices. Everything which strikes us 

 at that moment has a strong influence upon the result and helps 

 to make up a compound direction, composed almost as in mechanics, 

 and without some quick turning aside we cannot stop it. Fertur 

 equis auriga nee audit currus habenas [The driver is borne on by his 

 horses and the chariot heeds not his guidance].' The quotation is 

 from Virgil, Georgics, i. 514. 



1 Part iii. of this Introduction, p. 127 note. 



