STATEMENT OF LEIBNIZ S PHILOSOPHY 145 



ably act from a reason the opposite of which is self- 

 contradictory : it frequently acts from a sufficient reason, 

 .that is to say, from an inclining or probable reason. We 

 do not act merely because we must, because the eternal 

 nature of things makes it absolutely impossible to do 

 otherwise. We act towards an end or ideal which is 

 not a mere fiction of our own imagination, but a recogni- 

 tion of the fitness of things, a more or less clear perception 

 of the best among various possible courses of action. Our 

 will is thus determined by a moral, not a metaphysical 

 necessity, by the inclination which arises from its re- 

 cognition of the best, however perfect or imperfect 

 that recognition may be. Our will (being our conscious 

 appetition) moves in accordance with our ideals ; for 

 these ideals are nothing but our perceptions, the potenti- 

 alities of our nature, and not merely of our own nature, 

 but of the nature of all things, since our perceptions are 

 representations of the whole universe. 



Freedom is Spontaneity + Intelligence. 



Accordingly Leibniz, following Aristotle, regards free- 

 dom as consisting essentially in spontaneity and intelli- 

 gence. But intelligence is not to be interpreted merely 

 as the abstract understanding of pure self- consciousness : 

 it includes every degree of perception or representation. 

 There is thus an infinite variety of degrees in freedom, 

 and no actual concrete substance is subject to an abso- 

 lutely pure necessity, that is, to a necessity which is other 

 than an infinitely small degree of freedom. And as all 

 Monads alike have spontaneity (for they unfold the whole 

 of their life from within themselves), the degree of freedom 

 belonging to any Monad depends on the degree of its 

 intelligence, that is to say, on the^, degree of clearness 

 and distinctness of its perceptions. Similarly in human 

 beings, an action is free in proportion to the clearness \ 

 and distinctness of the reasons which determine it. Thus 

 a capricious or wilful action, far from indicating any 



L 



