156 INTRODUCTION 



Descartes himself * took a good part of his best thoughts ' 

 from the men of old l . And thus, Leibniz would say, it 

 is better frankly to own our obligations and to go back to 

 the past that we may, if possible, draw from it neglected 

 truths, by the aid of which our present theories may be 

 improved and thinking may go forward. For the idea 

 of progress on the basis of history controls the mind 

 of Leibniz, to whatever objects he directs his think- 

 ing 2 . Accordingly, admitting the value of the modern 

 mechanical philosophy, and yet being conscious of its 

 imperfections and dissatisfied with some of its results, 

 Leibniz turns back to Scholasticism and its roots in the 

 philosophy of Greece, to ' recover the gold from the 

 mire, ' and so build up a more perfect system 3 . Thus 

 Dillmann rightly contends that Leibniz can be properly 

 understood only if we recognize that his main endeavour 

 is to reconcile the modern mechanical view of things with 

 the ancient doctrine of 'substantial forms.' Yet it must 

 not be forgotten that Leibniz sought to effect this recon- 

 ciliation by modifying and reconstructing, and not by 

 merely dovetailing one system into another. 



The way of explaining phenomena by reference to 

 * substantial forms,' which Descartes and Gassendi rejected 

 in favour of a mechanical explanation of nature, was a 

 growth of the Peripatetic philosophy, which in course of 

 time had run to seed. It sprang originally from the 

 sound Aristotelian idea that all events or particular things 

 are to be explained by reference to active principles, not 



1 Lettre a Nicaise (1692) (E. 120 a ; G. ii. 534). Cf. De stilo philoso- 

 phico Nizolii (1670), 24 (E. 67 a ; G. iv. 154). 



2 Thus one of his latest (and not least able) expositors, E. Dill- 

 mann, offers Leibniz a homage which he himself would at once 

 have condemned. For Dillmann regards the philosophy of Leibniz 

 as final and all-sufficient, if only it be rightly understood. ' The 

 Monadology is the most perfect fruit of philosophical reflexion, 

 the most complete and brilliant system in the history of philo- 

 sophy.' (Neue DarsteUung, &c., p. 525.) There is a strange irony 

 in the fact that so able and devoted a disciple has so completely 

 missed his master's spirit. 



3 Lettre a Remond (1714) (E. 704 b ; G. iii. 625). 



