J 70 INTRODUCTION 



out the writings of his pre-critical period, we find Kant 

 working towards a view of space in which the Leibnitian 

 and Newtonian positions shall be reconciled. Although 

 he does not himself express it in this way, his problem 

 might fairly be regarded as that of finding a single Con- 

 ception of space which can take the place both of the 

 * real ' and of the * imaginary ' space of Wolff. In what 

 sense can space be regarded as at once real and ideal ? 

 Not in the Wolffian sense ; for that practically involves 

 a circulus in definiendo : i simultaneous or co-existing ' 

 physical things presuppose space. Nor is the Newtonian 

 view more satisfactory-, for, while it recognizes that space 

 is prior to actual cases of spatial existence and while it 

 maintains the reality of space, it implies that the whole 

 universe is set in space and that the spatial system of 

 relations has a real existence independent of the things 

 related. Accordingly, through a course of thinking which 

 we need not here trace \ Kant arrives at the position which 

 he expounds in the Critique of Pure Reason, namely, that 

 space is a form presupposed in the possibility of our 

 sense-experience. It is not in any way given ab extra ; 

 but it is the condition of there being externality for us. 

 It is not a thing in itself, a real object ; but as it is a per- 

 fectly pure perception, free from all the contingent detail 



we could still distinguish them through their places in space (as it 

 is possible to perceive quite similar and equal spaces outside of one 

 another without being able to say that they are one and the same 

 space, for otherwise we could put the whole of infinite space into 

 a cubic inch or less). Leibniz could not admit this, for he re- 

 cognizes no other distinction among things than that which is made 

 through notions [Begriffe], and refuses to allow any way of repre- 

 sentation specifically distinct from this, such as intuition [An- 

 schauung], and more especially intuition a priori. On the contrary 

 he thought that this must be reduced to pure notions [Begriffe] of 

 co-existence or succession, and thus he set himself against common 

 sense, which will never be persuaded that the existence of a drop 

 of water in one place makes it impossible for a perfectly similar 

 and equal drop to exist in another place.' 



1 For a full account see Caird's Critical Philosophy of Kant, vol. i. 

 Introduction, ch. 5, especially pp. 164-168 and 178-182. Also 

 bk. i. ch. 2, pp. 304, 305. Cf. Hutchison Stirling, Text-Book to Kant, 

 PP- 34-43 and 366 sqq. 



