ESTIMATE OF LEIBNIZ'S PHILOSOPHY 183 



Schopenhauer. 



As regards the main principles of his philosophy, 

 Schopenhauer (however unconsciously) follows Fichte 1 . 

 His starting-point is the Kantian distinction between the 

 intelligible or noumenal and the empirical or phenomenal 

 character of a real subject 2 . As in the philosophy of 

 Fichte, the ultimate reality is will. The l intelligible 

 character' is a will, which is the source of the 'empirical 

 character ' ; and in general will is a pure activity which 

 is the source of the system of phenomena. Thus the 

 world is will + idea (i. e. Vorstellung, representation, phe- 

 nomenon). The absolute is the purely practical activity 

 of will, which gives rise to the relative or mutually 

 conditioned, in a way which is beyond explanation, 

 for our understanding cannot pass the limits of the 

 conditioned, the phenomenal world. But this ultimate 

 will is essentially destitute of anything that can fairly 

 be described as ethical character. The world is not a 

 progress towards the realization of the best, but rather 

 an unfortunate episode' in the existence of the eternal 

 will, and the highest good is to be attained not by allow- 

 ing this will or striving (will to live) to have free course 

 in us, but by suppressing it as much as possible. The 

 expression, 'the world as will and idea,' recalls the 

 Leibnitian view of substance as essentially appetition 4- 

 perception. But Schopenhauer, like Fichte, gives to 

 will a metaphysical priority, which is not attributed 



Wallace's Logic of Hegel, Prolegomena (and ed.), ch. n. See also 

 chs. 12 and 13 for an account of Schelling with suggestive references 

 to Leibniz. In ch. 13 there is a lucid explanation of the various 

 meanings of the term ' Evolution,' as it is used by Leibniz and by 

 later writers. Cf. vol. ii. p. 424. 



1 ' Except his pessimism, which is no necessary consequence of 

 the system, there is absolutely nothing in Schopenhauer's philo- 

 sophy which is not contained in the later works of Fichte.' 

 Adamson, Fichte, p. 219. Though this is the statement of an expert, 

 I venture to think it a little too sweeping. 



2 Critique of Pure Reason, Rosenkranz, ii. 422 ; Hartenstein, ii. 420 ; 

 Meiklejohn, p. 333. 



