APPENDIX A 201 



states of the soul are naturally and essentially expressions of 

 the corresponding states of the world, and especially of the 

 bodies which for the time belong to the soul. Accordingly, 

 since the pin-prick is a part of the state of the body at the 

 moment B, the representation or expression of the pin-prick 

 (i. e. the pain) will be a part of the soul at the moment B ; for 

 as one motion follows from another motion, so one representa- 

 tion follows from another representation in a substance whose 

 nature is to be representative. Thus the soul must needs be 

 conscious of the pin-prick, when the laws of relation require 

 it to express more distinctly a more observable change in the 

 parts of its body. It is true that the soul is not always distinctly 

 conscious of the causes of the pin-prick and of its coming pain, 

 when these are still hidden in the representation of the state A, 

 as when we sleep or in some other way are unaware of the 

 approach of the pin. But that is because the motions of 

 the pin at that time make too little impression, and though 

 we are already in some way affected by all these motions and 

 their representations in our soul, and thus have within us the 

 representation or expression of the causes of the pin-prick, and 

 consequently the cause of the representation of the same pin- 

 prick, that is to say, the cause of the pain yet we can unravel 

 them from the multitude of other thoughts only when they 

 become noticeable. Our soul reflects only upon the more 

 marked phenomena, which stand out from the others ; not 

 thinking distinctly of any, when it thinks equally of all. After 

 this explanation, I cannot imagine where anybody can find the 

 least shadow of farther difficulty, unless he is prepared to 

 deny that God can create substances which are so made from 

 the beginning that each in virtue of its own nature is after- 

 wards in harmony with the phenomena of all the others. Now 

 nobody seems to deny this possibility, and since we see that 

 mathematicians represent in a machine the motions of the 

 heavenly bodies (as when 



Jura poll rerumque fidem legesque deorum 

 Cuncta Syracosius transtulit arte senex, 



which we can do to-day much better than Archimedes could in 

 his day), why could not God, who excels them infinitely, from 

 the beginning create representative substances in such a way 

 that they express by their own laws, according to the natural 

 change of their thoughts or representations, all that is to 



