APPENDIX B 203 



situation which each acquires with reference to every other, and 

 we can even determine the relation which any other [co-existent] 

 would have [to this], or which this would have to any other, if it 

 had not changed or if it had changed otherwise. And supposing 

 or feigning that among those co-existents there is a sufficient 

 number of them, which have undergone no change, then we 

 may say that those which now have to those fixed existents 

 a relation such as that which others formerly had to them, 

 have the same place which these latter had. And that which 

 comprehends all these places is called space, which shows that 

 in order to have an idea of place, and consequently of space, 

 it is sufficient to consider these relations and the rules of their 

 changes, without needing to fancy any absolute reality outside 

 of the things whose situation we consider. And, to give a kind 

 of definition : place is that which we say is the same for A and 

 for B, when the relation of co-existence between B and 

 C, E, F, G, &c., is in perfect agreement with the relation of 

 co-existence which A formerly had with the same C, E, F, Gr, 

 &c. ; provided that in C, E, F, G-, &c., there has been no cause 



of change Place is that which is the same in 



different moments to different existent things, when the re- 

 lations of co-existence between each and certain other existents, 

 which are supposed to continue fixed from moment to moment, 

 agree entirely together. And fixed existents are those in which 

 there has been no cause of change in the order of their co- 

 existence with others, or (which is the same thing) in which 

 there has been no motion. In short, space is that which 

 results from places taken together. And here it is right to 

 consider the difference between place and the relation of 

 situation which is in the body occupying the place. For the 

 place of A and B is the same ; whereas the relation of A to 

 the fixed bodies is not exactly and individually the same as 

 the relation which B (that comes into its place) will have to 

 the same fixed bodies : these relations are only in agreement. 

 For two different objects, as A and B, cannot have exactly the 

 same individual affection ; it being impossible that the same 

 individual accident should be in two objects or pass from one 

 object to another. But the mind, not satisfied with mere 

 agreement, looks for an identity, for something which should 

 be really the same, and conceives it as outside of the objects : 

 and this is what we here call place and space. But this can 

 only be an ideal thing, involving a certain order, in which 



