208 INTRODUCTION 



APPENDIX E. 



KANT ON HIS KELATION TO LEIBNIZ. 



THE Wolffians endeavoured to show that Kant's philosophy 

 was merely a degenerate product of Leibnitian thought. In 

 reply to Eberhard, Kant in 1790 wrote an interesting account 

 of his own relation to Leibniz Uber eine Entdeckung, nach der 

 alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine altere entbehrlich 

 gemacht werden soil. See Rosenkranz, i. pp. 478 sqq. ; Harten- 

 stein, iii. 390 sqq. 



'The metaphysic of Leibniz contains three great original 

 principles: (i) the principle of sufficient reason, especially in 

 so far as it shows the insufficiency of the principle of contra- 

 diction for the knowledge of necessary truths ; (2) the monad- 



ology ; (3) the doctrine of the pre-established harmony 



(i) Is it to be believed that Leibniz desired his principle of 

 sufficient reason to be understood objectively (as a law of 

 nature), when he attached a great importance to this principle 

 as an addition to the principles of earlier philosophy? It 

 is indeed so universally known and (within proper limits) so 

 manifestly clear, that the poorest intellect could not imagine 

 it had made a new discovery in finding it. Thus it is that 

 critics, who have misunderstood it, have greatly ridiculed it. 

 But for Leibniz this principle was merely a subjective one, that 

 is to say, a principle having reference merely to a critique 

 of reason. For what is meant by saying that, in addition 

 to the principle of contradiction, there must be other first 

 principles? It is as much as to say that, according to the 

 principle of contradiction only that can be known which is 

 already contained in the notion [Begriff] of the object ; but 

 if we say anything more about the object, something must 

 be added to this notion, and thus we must find a special 

 principle different from that of contradiction, for our assertions 

 must have their own special reason. Now propositions of thia 



