APPENDIX E 209 



latter kind are now-a-days called synthetic, and thus Leibniz 

 means nothing but this : " In addition to the principle of 

 contradiction (as the principle of analytic judgments), there 

 must be another principle, namely that of synthetic judgments." 

 This was a new and remarkable suggestion of investigations 

 in metaphysics which had not yet been undertaken (and which 



have actually been undertaken only recently) (2) Is 



it to be believed that so great a mathematician as Leibniz 

 held that bodies are composed of Monads (and consequently 

 that space is made up of simple parts) ? He referred not to 

 the corporeal world, but to its substratum imperceptible [uner- 

 kennbar] to us, namely, the intelligible world which belongs 

 merely to the idea of reason, and in which doubtless we 

 must represent to ourselves as made up of simple substances 

 everything which we think therein as compound substance. 

 He likewise appears, like Plato, to attribute to the human 

 mind an original, although at present only obscure, intellectual 

 intuition [AnscTiauen] of these supersensible realities. But in 

 this he did not refer to the things of sense, which he attributes 

 to intuition [Anschauung] of a special kind, of which we are 

 capable only in relation to things we can really know [fur uns 

 mogliche ErJcenntnisse], and he regards the things of sense 

 as mere phenomena (in the strict use of the term), as specific 

 forms of intuition peculiar to us. With regard to this we 

 must not allow ourselves to be perplexed by his explanation 

 of sensation as a confused kind of perception, but must rather 

 substitute for it another explanation more in harmony with 

 his main purpose; for otherwise his system would be in- 

 consistent with itself. To take this defect as a deliberate and 

 careful speculation on the part of Leibniz (as copiers, in order 

 to make their copy exactly the same as the original, reproduce 

 its mistakes of form and language) can hardly be credited to 

 the disciples of Leibniz as a service done to the fame of their 

 master. Similarly, if it is taken too literally, a wrong inter- 

 pretation is given to the view of Leibniz regarding the innate- 

 ness of certain notions, by which he means a fundamental 

 faculty to which the a priori principles of our knowledge are 

 referable : he makes use of this idea merely as against Locke, 

 who recognized no other than an empirical origin of these 

 principles. (3) Is it possible to believe that, by his pre- 

 established harmony between soul and body, Leibniz meant 

 a mutual conformity of two beings entirely independent of 



P 



