APPENDIX E 211 



between our mental powers of sense and understanding, ac- 

 cording to the special constitution of each in relation to the 

 other. In the same way criticism teaches that, in order to 

 a knowledge of things a priori, these powers must stand in 

 relationship to one another ;n the mind. That this was what 

 Leibniz really meant, although he did not clearly develop it, 

 appears from this, that he extends the application of the 

 pre-established harmony beyond the relation between soul 

 and body to the relation between the kingdom of nature and 

 the kingdom of grace (the kingdom of ends in relation to the 

 supreme end, i. e. man under moral laws). Here the harmony 

 is to be thought of as a harmony between what follows from 

 our notions of nature and what follows from our notions of 

 freedom, and thus as a harmony between two completely 

 different powers in us, having completely dissimilar principles, 

 and not between two different things taken as external to one 

 another. And this harmony, as the Critique teaches, can in 

 no way be comprehended from the nature of created things 

 [Weltwesen] but, as it is for us an essentially contingent har- 

 mony, it can only be understood by referring it to an intelligent 

 cause of the world.' 



p 2 



