217 



of the inter-relation of substances through the hypothesis of 

 the Pre-established Harmony and the doctrine of 'the best 

 of all possible worlds' ; (6) 61-82, explaining in more detail 

 the relations of particular classes of substances to one another, 

 and dealing with questions of organism and of the relations of 

 soul and body, including birth and death, &c. ; and (c) 83-90, 

 in which the whole system of relations is brought to unity in 

 God, the distinction and harmony between efficient and final 

 causes (which had been found to be the basis of the distinction 

 between body and soul), being supplemented by an analogous 

 distinction and harmony between the ' physical realm of nature 

 and the moral realm of grace, that is to say, between God, 

 considered as Architect of the machine of the universe and 

 God considered as Monarch of the divine City of spirits.' This 

 brief analysis is to be taken merely as a suggestion of the line 

 of thought in the Monadology ; the texture of the work is 

 so close that it is impossible to make perfectly satisfactory 

 divisions in it. 



The translation is made from the text given by M. Boutroux, 

 who has collated the MSS. at Hanover and corrected some 

 errors of Erdmann. The Monadology is given in E. 705 sqq. ; 

 G. vi. 607 sqq. 



1. The Monad, of which we shall here speak, is nothing 

 but a simple substance, which enters into compounds. 

 By 'simple 'is meant * without parts.' (Theod. 10.) 



2. And there must be simple substances, since there 

 are compounds ; for a compound 2 is nothing but a 

 collection or aggregatum of simple things 3 . 



2 There is a slight but interesting difference between this and 

 the corresponding passage in the Principles of Nature and of Grace (see 

 p. 406). Leibniz speaks here of ' a compound ' in general (le com- 

 pose') : in the other passage he uses the expression ' compound 

 substance ' (la composed). In both cases he must be understood to 

 mean 'body,' which, he -elsewhere tells us, is not a substance, 

 strictly speaking (Introduction, Part iii. pp. 96 and in). Accord- 

 ingly, the expression here is more exact than that in the Principles 

 of Nature and of Grace ; but the difference illustrates the looseness 

 of Leibniz's terminology in this connexion. 



3 If the ' simple things ' are, like the Monads, non-quantitative, 

 can we attach any intelligible meaning to ' compounds/ which are 

 mere aggregates of them ? Does not an aggregate always imply 



