2l8 THE MONADOLOGY 



3. Now where there are no parts 4 , there can be neither 

 extension nor form [figure] nor divisibility. These Monads 

 are the real atoms of nature and, in a word, the elements 

 of things 5 . 



4. No dissolution of these elements need be feared, 

 and there is no conceivable way in which a simple sub- 

 stance can be destroyed by natural means. (Theod. 89.) 



5. For the same reason there is no conceivable way in 

 which a simple substance can come into being by natural 

 means, since it cannot be formed by the combination of 

 parts [composition] 6 . 



elements which are quantities, however small ? Leibniz elsewhere 

 makes it perfectly clear that nothing quantitative can ever be 

 absolutely simple, and thus there seems a weakness in his reasoning 

 at this point. The difficulty is fundamental and affects the whole 

 of Leibniz's system : it is, indeed, the crux of every Individualist 

 or Atomist philosophy. Leibniz's hypothesis of a ' living [formef] 

 atom,' a ' fertile simplicity,' a ' centre which expresses (or repre- 

 sents) an infinite circumference ' (Reponse aux Reflexions de Bayle, 

 1702, E. 187 a ; G. iv. 562), is the suggestion of a way out of 

 Atomism ; but it does not take us entirely out of the wood. We 

 have still, in the spirit of much of Leibniz's philosophizing, to 

 ask ourselves the question Are not " simple " and " compound " 

 purely relative terms, so that to search for an absolutely simple 

 thing is to explore blind alleys ? ' Kant shows us the blind alleys in 

 his second Antinomy (Critique of Pure Reason, Meiklejohn's Tr., p. 271). 

 See also the interesting analysis and criticism of Kant's arguments 

 in Hegel's Wissenscftaft der Logik. bk. i. div. 2, ch. i. sect. A, note. Cf. 

 Hegel's Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. iii. p. 525 (Eng. Tr., p. 449). 

 * i. e. where there are no spatial distinctions. 



5 Cf. New System, 3. Ordinary physical atoms have form and 

 extension ; and, though they may not be physically divisible, yet 

 they must be ideally divisible ad infinilum, inasmuch as they 

 occupy space. Thus for Leibniz all merely physical atoms are 

 unreal. Cf. Lange's History of Materialism, bk. i. sect. 4, ch. iv. 

 (Eng. Tr., vol. ii. pp. 124 sqq.). 



6 According to Leibniz a thing is produced by nature only when 

 it comes into being gradually, bit by bit. But the Monads, having 

 no parts, cannot come into being by the adding of part to part. 

 Yet it may be pointed out that every Monad has an internal 

 development, which is gradual. It is not born perfect, fully 

 realized. Why, then, should it not come into being by natural 

 means ? 



