228 THE MONADOLOGY 



grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions. 

 And supposing there were a machine, so constructed as to 

 think, feel, and have perception, it might be conceived as 

 increased in size, while keeping the same proportions, so 

 that one might go into it as into a mill. That being so, 

 we should, on examining its interior, find only parts 

 which work one upon another, and never anything by 

 which to explain a perception 30 . Thus it is in a simple 

 substance, and not in a compound or in a machine, that 

 perception must be sought for 31 . Further, nothing but 

 this (namely, perceptions and their changes) can be found 

 in a simple substance. It is also in this alone that all 



System, which was published in the Journal des Savans of June 27, 

 1695 (the year before the second vol. of Bay4e's Dictionary appeared). 

 Bayle's criticism is directed mainly against the pre-established 

 harmony and the spontaneous development of all their states by 

 simple substances. Cf. Appendix F. p. 272. 



30 That is to say, even if we had microscopes powerful enough to 

 reveal to us, on a large scale, all the intricacies of nerve-cell and 

 nerve-fibre in the brain, we should still never get beyond figures and 

 motions. Cf. Commentatio de Anima Brutorum (1710)^. 463 a ; G. vii. 

 328) : ' If in that which is organic there is nothing but mechanism, that 

 is, bare matter, having differences of place, magnitude and figure ; 

 nothing can be deduced and explained from it, except mechanism, 

 that is, except such differences as I have just mentioned. For 

 from anything taken by itself nothing can be deduced and ex- 

 plained, except differences of the attributes which constitute it. 

 Hence we may readily conclude that in no mill or clock as such is 

 there to be found any principle which perceives what takes place 

 in it ; and it matters not whether the things contained in the 

 " machine " are solid or fluid or made up of both. Further we know 

 that there is no essential difference between coarse and fine bodies, 

 but only a difference of magnitude. Whence it follows that, if it 

 is inconceivable how perception arises in any coarse "machine," 

 whether it be made up of fluids or solids, it is equally inconceivable 

 how perception can arise from a finer "machine"; for if our 

 senses were finer, it would be the same as if we were perceiving 

 a coarse " machine," as we do at present.' See also New Essays, 

 Introduction, p. 400. (G. v. 59 ; E. 203 a.) 



31 Mechanism always means partes extra paries. This is character- 

 istic of all compounds, but not of any simple substances. Thus it 

 can never be said that matter thinks. Matter pre-supposes a 

 thinking or at least a 'perceiving' principle. 



