THE MONADOLOGY 229 



the internal activities of simple substances can consist. 

 (Theod. Pref. [E. 474 ; G. vi. 37].) 



( . 1 8. All simple substances or created Monads might be 



'called Entelechies 32 , for they have in them a certain per- 



fection (ZXOVO-L TO ZvT\<s] ; they have a certain self-sufficiency 



(avTapKtLa) which makes them the sources of their internal 



activities and, so to speak, incorporeal automata 33 . (Theod. 



32 li/reAe'xem is probably derived from kv re\et %x fiv > to be complete 

 or absolute. Leibniz's use of the term differs considerably from 

 that of Aristotle. VT\ex eia i n Aristotle is the state of perfection 

 or realization in which IWpycto, as a process, ends, rovvop-a. iy^pytia 

 At'yercu Kara TO epyov, /cat avvTflvei irpos TT)V tvTeXt\fiav. Melaph. 0, 8, 

 ic>5o a 22. But the distinction between Iz/TfAexfia and evtpyeia in 

 Aristotle is not by any means a sharp one. Thus he defines the soul 

 (fax?]} as VTt\(x f t<*- "n TrpujTrj awfMTOS (pvaiKov dvvdp.fi farjv ZXOVTOS. De 

 Anima, ii. i. But elsewhere he calls it ovffia Kal tvepyfia owpaTos 

 TIVOS. Metaph. H, 3, io43 a 35. First entelechy is related to second 

 entelechy as kiriarrip.^ (implicit) is related to Oewpeiv (explicit). 

 Thus the soul is denned as first or implicit entelechy because it 

 exists in sleep as well as awake. The entelechy of Leibniz, how- 

 ever, is to be understood as an individual substance or force, 

 containing within itself the principle of its own changes. It i 

 called entelechy, not because it is a state of perfect realization, 

 but because it contains in germ an infinity .of perfections, which 

 it tends to develop. It is thus not so much the final developed 

 condition of a thing, opposed to its potentiality (Swapis -or vkrj), but 

 it rather implies the tendency or virtuality, of which Leibniz 

 speaks as something intermediate between the bare potency (puis- 

 sance) and the fully developed activity (acte) of the Scholastics. 

 Cf. Introduction, Part iii. pp. 91, 105. ' The Forms of the Ancients 

 or Entelechies are nothing but forces.' Lettre au Pere Bouvet, E. 146 a. 

 Cf. Trendelenbui'g, De Anima, pp. 295, 320. In the eighth book of 

 Aristotle's Metaphysics there is a remark of much interest, when 

 considered in relation to Leibniz : rj ovaia v OUTCWS, a\\' oi>x wj 

 \cyovcri TtvfS olov poi/ds TIS ovffa r) (nty/J-rj, dAA.' vrf\e\fia teal (pvffis TIS 

 ctcdaTr). H, 3, 1044* 7. povds is, of course, used here in its original 

 sense of a unit. 



33 That is to say, not merely machines, such as those made by 

 man, but entirely self-moving machines or machines which contain 

 within themselves the ground or principle of all their states or 

 conditions, in as complete independence of all else as if there were 

 nothing in the universe but God and themselves. Monads alone 

 are automata in this sense. Corporeal automata, in so far as they 



