230 THE MONADOLOGY 



19. If we are to give the name of Soul to everything 

 which has perceptions and desires [appetits] in the general 

 sense which I have explained, then all simple substances 

 or created Monads might be called souls ; but as feeling 

 \le sentiment] is something more than a bare perception, 

 I think it right that the general name of Monads or 

 Entelechies should suffice for simple substances which 

 have perception only, and that the name of Souls should 

 be given only to those in which perception is more 

 distinct, and is accompanied by memory 34 . 



20. For we experience in ourselves a condition in which 

 we remember nothing and have no distinguishable per- 

 ception ; as when we fall into a swoon or when we are 

 overcome with a profound dreamless sleep. In this state 

 the soul does not perceptibly differ from a bare Monad ; 

 but as this state is not lasting, and the soul comes out of 

 it, the soul is something more than a bare Monad. 

 (Theod. 64.) 



21. And it does not follow that in this state the simple 

 substance is without any perception. That, indeed, 

 cannot be, for the reasons already given ; for it cannot 

 perish, and it cannot continue to exist without being 

 affected in some way, and this affection 35 is nothing but 

 its perception. But when there is a great multitude of 

 little perceptions, in which there is nothing distinct, one 

 is stunned ; as when one turns continuously round in the 



are corporeal, cannot be said to have this avrapKaa. Cf. 64. 

 Spinoza speaks of the soul as * acting according to certain laws and 

 us if it were a kind of spiritual automaton/ De Intellectus Emenda- 

 tione, 85 ; Bruder's ed., ii. 34. 



34 Memory is thus the sign of consciousness as distinct from 

 unconscious perception. This is in harmony with the view, em- 

 phasized by modern writers, that conscious sensation pre-supposes 

 memory, because we can know one sensation only when it has 

 been brought into comparison with others. Leibniz in one of his 

 early writings suggestively remarks that body is 'momentary 

 mind, i. e. mind without memory ' (mens momentanea, seu carem 

 recordatione). Theoria Motus Abstracti (1671) (G. iv. 230). 



35 Leibniz originally wrote * variation.' 



