232 THE MONADOLOGY 



thing similar to this takes place in smell, in taste and in 

 touch, and perhaps in a number of other senses, which 

 are unknown to us 4l . And I will explain presently 42 how 

 that which takes place in the soul represents what happens 

 in the bodily organs. 



26. Memory provides the soul with a kind of consecu- 

 tiveness 43 , which resembles [imite] reason, but which is to 

 be distinguished from it. Thus we see that when animals 

 have a perception of something which strikes them and 

 of which they have formerly had a similar perception, 

 they are led, by means of representation in their memory, 

 to expect what was combined with the thing in this pre- 

 vious perception, and they come to have feelings similar 

 to those they had on the former occasion. For instance, 

 when a stick is shown to dogs, they remember the pain 

 it has caused them, and howl and run away 44 . (TJieod. 

 Discours de la Conformite, &c., 65.) 



2 7. And the strength of the mental image which im- 

 presses and moves them comes either from the magnitude 

 or the number of the preceding perceptions. For often 

 a strong impression produces all at once the same effect 

 as a long-formed habit, or as many and oft-repeated 

 ordinary perceptions 45 . 



41 Cf. Lubbock, Ants, Bees and Wasps, ch. 8, especially pp. 220 

 and 225. 



42 See 61 and 62. 



43 Consecutio, concatenation or sequence of perceptions. Leibniz 

 is referring to what would now be called association of ideas. 

 Cf. Nouveaux Essais, bk. ii. ch. n, n (E. 237 b; G. v. 130), and 

 bk. ii. ch. 33 (E. 296 a ; G. v. 252). In the latter of these chapters 

 (' On the Association of Ideas ') he is thinking mainly of a ' non- 

 natural connexion of ideas/ as in the case of strange prejudices or 

 superstitions. 



41 Does Leibniz in this section, as some critics maintain, over- 

 look his * Pre-established Harmony ' and unconsciously adopt tho 

 ordinary point of view, which implies that substances do really 

 act upon one another and are not each the cause of all its own 

 experiences ? ^ 



45 Cf. Nouveaux Essais, bk. ii. ch. 33 (E. 296 a ; G. v. 252! 'And 

 as the reasons ' [of the connexion of things] ' are often unknown to 



