THE MONADOLOGY 235 



v^ 31. Our reasonings are grounded upon two great princi- 

 ples, that of contradiction, in virtue of which we judge 

 false that which involves a contradiction, and true that 

 which is opposed or contradictory to the false 50 ; (Theod. 

 44, 169.) 



32. And that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which 

 we hold that there can be no fact real or existing, no 

 statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason, why 

 it should be so and not otherwise, although these reasons 

 usually cannot be known by us 51 . (Theod. 44, 196.) 



33. There are also two kinds of truths, those of reason- 

 source, which is God . . . we first of all come upon the ego, or the 

 being which is in us, in so far as it is limited and distinct from 

 other beings, and then upon being, substance and the immaterial, 

 coming ever nearer to the Divine Essence itself. And finally, 

 through perception which has thus become reflective and conscious, 

 we reach the Infinite Being, whom, from the first, created beings 

 are seeking confusedly and unwittingly. Then the circle, so to 

 speak, closes upon itself : the created being identifies itself with 

 the Creator in so far as He is in it ; the finite has done all that its 

 nature allowed in the way of reproducing the infinite.' (Edition 

 of La Monadologic, p. 156.) 



50 Cf. Introduction, Part ii. pp. 58 sqq. Leibniz sometimes 

 distinguishes between the principle of contradiction and that of 

 identity (A = A). But he recognizes that they are ultimately one. 

 Cf. Nouveaux Essals, bk. iv. ch. 2, i (E. 339 a; G. v. 343). 'The 

 principle of contradiction is in general : a proposition is either true or 

 false. This contains two true statements ; (i) that the true and the 

 false are not compatible in the same proposition or that a proposition 

 cannot be true and false at the same time ; (2) that the opposites or 

 negations of the true and the false are not compatible, or that 

 there is no middle term between the true and the false, or rather 

 that it is impossible for a proposition to be neither true nor false.' See 

 Aristotle, Metaph. T, 3, ioo5 b 19 and 7, ion b 23. 



51 In his earlier writings Leibniz calls the sufficient reason the 

 determining reason, meaning the reason which determines the exis- 

 tence of this or that out of a number of possibilities, each of which 

 involves no self-contradiction. As synonymous with the ' principle 

 of sufficient 'reason,' he also sometimes uses the phrase, 'principle 

 of fitness [convenance'] or of harmony.' He thus suggests that the 

 sufficient reason of a thing is always to be found in its relations to 

 other things, its place in the general system. We give the sufficient 

 reason of anything when we show its ' compossibility ' with other 



