236 THE MONADOLOGY 



ing and those of fact 52 . Truths of reasoning are necessary 

 and their opposite is impossible : truthg of fact are con- 

 tingent and their opposite is possible 53 . When a truth is 

 necessary, its reason can be found by analysis, resolving 

 it into more simple ideas and truths, until we come to 

 those which are , primary 5 \ (T7ieod. 170, 174, 189, 280- 

 282, 367. Abrege, Object. 3.) 



things in addition to its abstract 'possibility.' The principle of 

 sufficient reason is the principle of final cause. Leibniz's adoption 

 of the word ' sufficient ' is supposed to have been suggested by its 

 use in Mathematics in a sense similar to that in which we say that 

 a certain magnitude ' satisfies ' a particular equation. 



52 Cf. the Scholastic ratio cognoscendi and ratio essendi. 



53 Cf. Theodicee, 174 (E. 557 b ; G. vi. 217). 'It may be said of 

 M. Bayle : Ubi bene, nemo melius, though it ciould not be said of him, 

 as it was said of Origen: Ubi male, nemo pejus. . . . Yet M. Bayle adds 

 at the end ' [of a passage, quoted by Leibniz in the previous section] 

 'words which somewhat spoil what he has so justly remarked. 

 " Now what contradiction would there have been if Spinoza had 

 died at Leyden ? Would nature have been less perfect, less wise, 

 less powerful ? " He here confounds what is impossible, because it 

 involves a contradiction, with what cannot happen, because it is 

 not well fitted to be chosen. It is true that there would have been 

 no contradiction in the supposition that Spinoza had died at 

 Leyden and not at the Hague : it was perfectly possible. Accord- 

 ingly, as regards the power of God, the matter was indifferent. 

 But it must not be imagined that any event, however insignificant, 

 can be regarded as indifferent in relation to God's wisdom and 

 goodness.' 



54 Leibniz does not give us a very clear idea of the relations of 

 the two principles to the two kinds of truths. This is probably 

 due to his hesitancy regarding the relations of the two principles 

 to one another. In the Appendix to the The'odicee entitled Remarques 

 ftur le livre de M. King, Leibniz says (E. 641 b; G. vi. 414): 'Both 

 principles must apply not only to necessary, but also to contingent 

 truths, and, indeed, that which has no sufficient reason must 

 necessarily be non-existent. For it may in a manner be said that 

 these two principles are included in the definition of the true and 

 the false. Nevertheless when, by analyzing a suggested truth, we 

 see that it depends upon truths whose opposite involves a contra- 

 diction, we can say that it is absolutely necessary. But when, 

 carrying our analysis as far as we like, we can never reach such 

 elements of the given truth, it must be said to be contingent, and 

 to have its origin in a prevailing reason, which inclines without 

 necessitating.' But on the other hand, at a later date, Leibniz 



