THE MONADOLOGY 239 



39. Now as this substance is a sufficient reason of all 

 this variety of particulars, which are also connected 

 together throughout ; there is only one God, and this God 

 is sufficient. 



40. We may also hold that this supreme substance, 

 which is unique, universal c:j and necessary, nothing out- 

 er by representation in the ideas themselves. The same things are 

 said to be formally in the objects of the ideas, when they exist in 

 the objects just as we conceive them to exist ; and they are said 

 to be eminently in the objects, when they do not really exist as we 

 conceive them, but when they are so great that their excellence 

 makes up . for this defect.' Reponses aux Deuxiemes Objections. 

 Raisons qui prouvent I' existence de Dieu, iii. and iv., cf. note on this 

 distinction in Veitch's Translation of Descartes. 'Formally' as opposed 

 to 'objectively' is almost equivalent to our ' objectively' (as opposed to 

 1 subjectively ') or ' really ' (as opposed to ' in idea '). As opposed 

 to eminently, formally is secundum eandem formam et rationem, while 

 eminently is gradu or modo eminentiori. 



62 That is to say, all particular things are connected together 

 in one system, which implies one principle, one necessary 

 substance, one God. The argument is not merely from the 

 existence of order in the world to the existence of an intelligence 

 which produces this order, but from the fact that the whole forms 

 one system to the existence of one ultimate sufficient reason of the 

 whole. Otherwise there might be various ' orders ' or ' disorders ' 

 in conflict with one another, each pre-supposing its own first 

 principle or ' God/ This is Leibniz's form of the Cosmological 

 proof of the existence of God. 



63 l Universal ' in the sense of being equally the cause or first 

 principle of all things. The whole spirit of Leibniz's philosophy is 

 opposed to the supposition of a universal substance or spirit, of 

 which all particular substances are merely modes. Thus in the 

 Considerations sur la Doctrine d'un Esprit Universel (1702) he endeavours 

 to refute the view that ' there is but one spirit, which is universal 

 and which animates the whole universe and all its parts, each 

 according to its structure and according to the organs it possesses, 

 as the same blast of wind produces a variety of sounds from 

 different organ-pipes ' or that ' the universal spirit is like an ocean 

 composed of an infinite number of drops, which are separated from 

 it when they animate some particular organic body and which are 

 reunited with their ocean after the destruction of the organism.' 

 This is 'the view of Spinoza and of other similar authors, who will 

 have it that there is only one substance, viz. God, who thinks, 

 believes and wills one thing in me, and who thinks, believes and 

 wills quite the opposite in some one else an opinion the absurdity 



