240 THE MONADOLOGY 



side of it being independent of it, this substance, which 

 is a pure sequence of possible being, must be illimitable 

 and must contain as much reality as is possible 64 . 



\iy Whence it follows that God is absolutely perfect ; 

 for perfection is nothing but amount of positive reality, 

 in the strict sense, leaving out of account the limits or 

 bounds in things which are limited. And where there 

 are no bounds, that is to say in God, perfection is abso- 

 lutely infinite. (Theod. 22, Pref. [E. 469 a; G. vi. 27].) 



/4?. It follows also that created beings derive their 

 perfections from the influence of God, but that their 

 imperfections come from their own nature, which is 

 incapable of being without limits. For it is in this that 

 they differ from God 65 . An instance of this original 

 imperfection of created beings may be seen in the natural 

 imrtia of bodies 66 . (Theod. 20, 27-30, 153, 167, 377 sqq.) 



of which M. Bayle has well shown in several places in his 

 dictionary' (E. 178 a, 181 b, 182 a ; G. vi. 529, 535, 537). 



64 As God is the sufficient reason of all, nothing is independent 

 of Him. But if His possibility were in any way limited, it must 

 be by some possibility outside and independent of Him. Con- 

 sequently His possibility cannot be limited. And unlimited possi- 

 bility means unlimited reality and unlimited existence. For that 

 which is possible must be real, unless there is something else with 

 which it is not compossible, that is to say, unless there is some other 

 possible thing, whose nature limits it. Cf. 54 and Introduction, 

 Part ii. p. 63. The argument in this and the following sections 

 will become clear if we keep in view the idea which Leibniz seeks 

 constantly to emphasize in every department of thought, namely 

 that possibility or potentiality is never a mere empty capacity, 

 a tabula rasa, a potentia nuda, but always, in however small a degree, 

 a tendency to realization, which is kept back only by other similar 

 tendencies. This is what is meant by the 'claims' and 'aspirations' 

 of the Monads, mentioned in 51 and 54. 



65 Created beings must be essentially limited ; otherwise they 

 would not be created, but would be identical with God. In the 

 Theodice'e Leibniz (following the Scholastic principle, ton-urn habet 

 causam efficientem, malum autem deficientem), uses this as a hypothesis 

 by which to remove from God the responsibility for the existence 

 of evil. The origin of evil is the essential imperfection of created 

 substances ; and God is the cause only of the perfection or positive 

 reality of created things. 



66 This sentence is not given by E. It seems to have been added 



