THE MONADOLOGY 24! 



43. It is farther true that in God there is not only the 

 source of existences but also that of essences, in so far as 

 they are real, that is to say, the source of what is real in 

 the possible 67 . For the understanding of God is the 

 region of eternal truths or of the ideas on which they 

 depend 68 , and without Him there would be nothing real 

 in the possibilities of things, and not only would there 

 be nothing in existence, but nothing would even be 

 possible. (Theod. 20.) 



by Leibniz in revising the first copy of the Monadology. G. gives it 

 in a foot-note. The natural inertia of a body is its passivity or 

 that in it which limits its activity. So far as the passivity of the 

 body is real (i.e. not a mere appearance to us), it consists of confused 

 perception. But God is adits purus, entirely without passivity, and 

 His perceptions are all perfectly clear and distinct. 



67 That is to say, God is not only the source of all actual existence, 

 but also the source of all potential existence, of all that tends to 

 exist. 'What is real in the possible ' is its tendency to exist. In 

 a sense, 'essences' or 'possible' things are independent of God. 

 He does not create them as essences. They are the objects of His 

 understanding, and ' He is not the author of His own under- 

 standing' (Theodicee, 380; E. 614 b ; G. vi. 341^ The nature _of 

 essences or^possibiljties is determined solely by thejgrinciple ^)f 

 contradiction. And yet, in another sense, they may be said to be 

 dependent upon God, Inasmuch as they are all expressions of His 

 nature in one or another aspect or with particular limitations. 

 His freedom, however, extends only to a choice of those which 

 shall actually exist, and this choice is determined by His wisdom 

 and His goodness, having regard to the nature of the ' essences ' 

 themselves. 'Without Him there would be nothing in existence,' 

 for the existence of things is the result of His will, His choice. 

 'Without Him nothing would be possible' for all that is possible 

 is the object of His understanding, and as His understanding is 

 perfect (i.e. entirely free from confusion in its perceptions), its 

 object must be the ultimate nature of things, that is, the very 

 essence of God Himself. Thus in 44 Leibniz practically identifies 

 'essences' or 'possibilities' with 'eternal truths.' Cf. Introduction, 

 Part ii. p. 66. 



68 Leibniz connects this part of his system with Plato's world 

 of ideas. He mentions as one of the ' many most excellent doctrines 

 of Plato' that 'there is in the Divine mind an intelligible world, 

 which I also am wont to call the region of ideas.' Epistola ad 

 Hanschium (1707% E. 445 b. 



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