246 THE MONADOLOGY 



51. But in simple substances the influence of one 

 Monad upon another is only ideal, and it can have its 

 effect only through the mediation of God, in _so_far_as in 

 the ideas of God any Monad rightly claims that God, in 

 regulating the others from the beginning of things, should 

 have regard to it. For since one created Monad cannot 

 have any physical influence upon the inner being of 

 another, it is only by this means that the one can be 

 dependent upon the other 81 . (Theod. 9, 54, 65, 66, 201. 

 Abrege. Object. 3.^ 



52. Accordingly, among created things, activities and 

 passivities are mutual. For God, comparing two simple 

 substances, finds in each reasons which oblige Him to 

 adapt the other to it 82 , and consequently what is active in 

 certain respects is passive from another point of view 83 ; 



a thing arises solely from the liberating of its essential activities, 

 and that the Monads claim existence in proportion to their per- 

 fection, that is to say, to the distinctness of their perceptions. 

 Cause and effect are relative : every created Monad is both at 

 once. God alone is pure cause or reason (actus purus). Cause = 

 relative activity = relative distinctness of perception. This may 

 instructively be compared and contrasted with the views of 

 Berkeley and Hume regarding cause and 'necessary connexion.' 

 See Introduction. Part iii. p. 105. Cf. also Spinoza, Ethics, Part iii. 

 Def. i and 2, and Prop, i, 2 and 3. 



81 We have here the principle of the Pre-established Harmony 

 (further referred to in 80 and 81). It is a harmony or mutual 

 compatibility in the very nature of things, anterior to their 

 creation. Its perfection in the actual world is the ground of God's 

 choice of that world ; and thus it is not in any sense a created 

 harmony. In this respect it differs from every form of Occa- 

 sionalism. See Introduction, Part ii. pp. 39 sqq. 



82 No two simple substances are exactly the same, yet all represent 

 the same universe. Therefore a perception which is comparatively 

 distinct in one must be comparatively confused in another or 

 others, and whatever changes take place in one must be accom- 

 panied by corresponding changes in the others. Thus each fits 

 into the others. 



63 Leibniz's expression here is point de consideration. But he 

 generally uses the phrase point de vue, which he introduced as 

 a regular term in philosophical literature. It need hardly be 

 remarked that the term has a peculiar importance in Leibniz's 

 philosophy. 



