248 THE MONADOLOGY 



55. Thus the actual existence of the best that wisdom 

 makes known to God is due to this, that His goodness 

 makes Him choose it, and His power makes Him produce 

 it 87 . (Theod. 8, 78, 80, 84, 119, 204, 206, 208. Abregt. 

 Object, i and 8.) 



56. Now this connexion or adaptation of all created 

 things to each and of each to all, means that each simple 

 substance has relations which express all the others, and, 

 consequently, that it is a perpetual living mirror of the 

 universe 88 . (Theod. 130, 360.) 



57. And as the same town, looked at from various sides, 

 appears quite different and becomes as it were numerous 

 in aspects [perspectivement] ; even so, as a result of the 

 infinite number of simple substances, it is as if there 

 were so many different universes, which, nevertheless are 

 nothing but aspects [perspectives] of a single universe, 

 according to the special point of view of each Monad 89 . 

 (Theod. 147.) 



. contain or to their degree of perfection ; for perfection is nothing 

 but quantity of essence.' Ultimate Origination of Things, p. 340. 



87 This section states briefly the principles of Leibniz's Optimism, 

 which are fully expounded and defended in the Theodicee. A world 

 entirely free from evil would be indistinguishable from God 

 Himself. The evil of the world arises entirely from the essential 

 limitations of created things their limitations as essences or 

 possibilities. Consequently evil is not created by God ; but He 

 creates the universe in which there is the least amount of evil that 

 is possible in any system of things. 



88 Cf. Nicholas of Cusa, Dialogi de ludo gloli (1454-59% i- J 57 a : 

 ' The whole is reflected in all the parts ; all things keep their own 

 relation [habitudo] and proportion to the universe.' Also De docta 

 ignorantia (1440), i. n : ' Visible things are images of the invisible, 

 and the Creator can be seen and known by the creatures as in 

 a mirror darkly [quasi in speculo et aenigmate].' 



89 The ' point of view ' of each Monad is its body. But we must 

 not give a spatial meaning to the expression, as if the Monad's 

 point of view depended on its having this or that position in 

 space. For the Monad is absolutely non-spatial, and the nature of 

 its body depends on the degree of confusedness (or distinctness) 

 of its perceptions. Thus to say that the body is the point of view 

 of the soul means simply that the particular way in which the soul 

 represents or perceives the universe is determined by the degree 



