THE MONADOLOGY 249 



58. And by this means there is obtained as great 

 variety as possible, along with the greatest possible order ; 

 that is to say, it is the way to get as much perfection as 

 possible 90 . (TJieod. 120, 124, 241 sqq., 214, 243, 275.) 



59. Besides, no hypothesis but this (which I venture to 

 call proved) fittingly exalts the greatness of God ; and 

 this Monsieur Bayle recognized when, in his Dictionary 

 (article Eorarius* 1 }, he raised objections to it, in which 



of distinctness of its perceptions. Cf. Theodicee, 357 (E. 607 b ; 

 G. vi. 327). ' The projections of perspective, which, in the case of 

 the circle, are the same as the Conic Sections, show that one and 

 the same circle can be represented by an ellipse, by a parabola 

 and by a hyperbola, and even by another circle, by a straight line 

 and by a point. Nothing seems more different, nothing more 

 unlike, than these figures ; and yet there is an exact relation 

 between them, point for point. Thus it must be recognized that 

 each soul represents to itself the universe, according to its point of 

 view and by a relation peculiar to itself; but in this there always 

 continues to be a perfect harmony.' 



90 For Leibniz the highest perfection is the most complete unity 

 or order in the greatest variety. The Monads have the most 

 complete unity, because the essence of each consists in representing 

 the same universe, while they have the greatest variety, because 

 the points of view from which they represent it are infinitely 

 various. ' For a world to be possible, it is enough that it should 

 have intelligibility ; but in order to exist it must have a pre- 

 eminence [prevalence] in intelligibility or order ; for there is order in 

 proportion as there is much to distinguish in a manifold [multitude].' 

 Lettre a Bourguet (1712 ?) (E. 718 b ; G. iii. 558). 



91 See note 29. Bayle compares Leibniz's theory to the sup- 

 position that a ship might be constructed of such a kind that 

 entirely by itself, without captain or crew, it could sail from place 

 to place for years on end, accommodating itself to varying winds, 

 avoiding shoals, casting and weighing anchor, seeking a haven 

 when necessary and doing all that a normal ship can. He admits 

 that the omnipotence of God could give such a power to a ship, biit 

 he maintains that the nature of the ship would make it impossible 

 for it to receive such a power. And ' however infinite be the 

 knowledge and power of God, He cannot, by means of a machine 

 which lacks a certain part, do that which requires the help of that 

 part.' Thus Bayle argues against the possibility of complete 

 spontaneity in the Monads, and consequently maintains that the 

 Deus ex machina is involved in Leibniz's Pre-established Harmony 

 quite as much as in Occasionalism. 



