250 THE MONADOLOGY 



indeed he was inclined to think that I was attributing too 

 much to God more than it is possible to attribute. But 

 he was unable to give any reason which could show the 

 impossibility of this universal harmony, according to 

 which every substance exactly expresses all others through 

 the relations it has with them. 



60. Further, in what I have just said there may be 

 seen the reasons a priori why things could not be other- 

 wise than they are. For God in regulating the whole has 

 had regard 92 to each part, and in particular to each Monad, 

 whose nature being to represent, nothing can confine it to 

 the representing of only one part of things ; though it is 

 true that this representation is merely confused as regards 

 the variety of particular things \le detail] in the whole 

 universe, and can be distinct only as regards a small part 

 of things, namely, those which are either nearest or 

 greatest 93 in relation to each of the Monads; otherwise 

 each Monad would be a deity. It is not as regards their 

 object, but as regards the different ways in which they 

 have knowledge of their object, that the Monads are 

 limited 94 . In a confused way they all strive after 

 [vont a] the infinite, the whole 95 ; but they are limited 

 and differentiated through the degrees of their distinct 

 perceptions. 



6 1. And compounds are in this respect analogous with 



92 So G. E. reads ' has a regard ' [a un egard]. 



>3 If the Monads are non-spatial, how can we speak of anything 

 being nearest or greatest in relation to a Monad ? Every Monad 

 has a body of some kind and this body is confusedly perceived as 

 spatial in itself and in relation to other bodies, though really it is 

 nothing but an aggregate of non-spatial Monads. When therefore 

 it is said that certain things are near or great in relation to 

 a Monad, what is meant is that they are near or great in relation 

 to the body of the Monad. 



94 That is to say, thought in the widest sense, conscious or un- 

 conscious, is limited only by itself : there can be nothing that is 

 not an object of thought, more or less adequate. Contrast with 

 this the position of Kant. See Introduction, Part iv, pp. 178 sqq. 



95 Cf. Nicholas of Cusa, Dialogus de Genesi (1447) 72 b : 'All 

 things seek the same, which is something absolute.' 



