252 THE MONADOLOGY 



that which is there represented distinctly ; it cannot all at 

 once unroll everything that is enfolded in it 98 , for its 

 complexity is infinite". 



The mistake may be due to an imperfect recollection 

 of the phrase in Hippocrates : vppoia /Ja, ^v^irvoia juia, vp.TraOta 

 iravra. (De Alimento, 4, Littre, (Euvres d'Hippocrate, vol. ix. p. 106). 

 Cf. Plutarch, De fato, 574 E : TO <f>va(t oioineiaOat rovftf rov nuapov 

 avfiirvovv, Kal avfjuraBfj, avrbv avrw ovra, For a later statement of the 

 same position, see Fichte, Werke, ii. 178 sqq. 'In every moment 

 of her duration, nature is one connected whole : in every moment 

 each part must be what it is, because all the others are what they 

 are. . . . You cannot conceive even the position of a grain of sand 

 other than it is in the present without being compelled to conceive 

 the whole indefinite past as having been other than it has been, 

 and the whole indefinite future other than it will be. ... I am 

 what I am because in this conjuncture of the great whole of nature 

 only such, and no other, was possible ; and a spirit who could look 

 through the secrets of nature would, from knowing one single man, 

 be able distinctly to declare what men had formerly existed and 

 what men would exist at any future moment ; in one individual he 

 would cognize all real individuals. My connexion, then, with the 

 whole of nature is that which determines what I have been, am, 

 and shall be, and the same spirit would be able, from any possible 

 moment of my existence, to discover infallibly what I had been 

 and what I was to become.' [Trans, by Prof. Adamson, Philosophy 

 of Kant ', p. 221.] 



98 E. reads ses regies: G. reads sesreplis. The latter phrase is used 

 in the Principles of Nature and of Grace, 13. 



y9 Cf. Leibnitiana, Dutens, vol. vi. Part i. p. 332. ' I admit that 

 after death we do not at first remember what we were, for this is 

 neither naturally right nor in accordance with the fitness of things 

 [ni propre ni bienseant dans la nature]. Nevertheless I believe that 

 whatever has once happened to the soul is eternally imprinted 

 upon it, although it does not at all times come back to us in 

 memory ; just as we know a number of things which we do not 

 always recollect, unless something suggests them and makes us 

 think aboxit them. For who can remember all things ? But since 

 in nature nothing is futile and nothing is lost, but everything 

 tends to perfection and maturity, each image our soul receives will 

 ultimately become one [un tout] with the things which are to come, 

 so that we shall be able to see all as in a mirror and thence to 

 derive that which we shall find to be more fitted to satisfy us. 

 Whence it follows that the more virtuous we have been and the 

 more good deeds we have done, the more shall we have of joy and 

 satisfaction.' 



