THE MONADOLOGY 257 



69. Thus there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing 

 dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusion save in 

 appearance n<? , somewhat as it might appear to be in a pond 

 at a distance, in which one would see a confused move- 

 ment and, as it were, a swarming of fish in the pond, 

 without separately distinguishing the fish themselves. 

 (Theod. Pref. [E. 4 75 b; 477 b ; G. vi. 40, 44].) 



70. Hence it appears that each living body has a domi- 

 nant entelechy, which in an animal is the soul ; but the 

 members of this living body are full of other living beings, 

 plants, animals, each of which has also its dominant 

 entelechy or soul ln . 



themselves to it.' The view of Leibniz also suggests the cell- 

 theory of modern physiology ; but the analogy must not be pushed 

 too far. However numerous, for instance, may be the cells in any 

 portion of an organism, they are not, like Leibniz's 'portions of 

 matter,' infinitely subdivided in their turn. In fact, the cell- 

 theory has in many ways a closer relation to the mechanical view 

 of things than to the position of Leibniz. See Sandeman, Problems 

 of Biology, pp. 53 sqq. 



110 Cf. Epistola ad Bernoullium (1699) (G. Math. iii. 565) : 'God, out 

 of the infinite number of possible things, chooses by His wisdom 

 that which is most fitting. . But it is- evident that if there were 

 a vacuum (and similarly if there were atoms) there would remain 

 sterile and fallow places, in which, nevertheless, without prejudice 

 to any other things, something might have been produced. But 

 it is not consistent with wisdom that such places should remain. 

 And I think that there is nothing sterile and fallow in nature, 

 although many things appear to us to be so.' 



111 See Introduction, Part iii. p. in. May not the whole world, 

 then, be conceived as one body, whose dominant soul is God, the 

 Monad of Monads ? 



'All are but parts of one stupendous whole, 

 Whose body nature is and God the soul.' 



Pope, Essay on Man, Epistle' i. 267. 



Yet Leibniz maintains that God has no body. Cf. Monadology, 72. 

 The difficulty is a fundamental one. Leibniz repeatedly disclaims 

 the doctrine of a 'world-soul,' if it is understood as in any way 

 destroying the independence of individual souls. 'Although a soul 

 may have a body composed of parts, each of which has a soul of its 

 own, the soul or form of the whole is not composed of the souls 

 or forms of the parts.' Lettre a Arnauld (1687) (G. ii. 100). 



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