THE MONADOLOGY 259 



bodies] nor unembodied spirits [genies sans corps]. God 

 "alone i s completely without body 115 . (Theod. 90, 124.) 



73- It also follows from this that there never is absolute^] 

 birth [generation] nor complete death, in the strict sense, \ 

 consisting in the separation of the soul from the body, j 

 What we call births [generations] are developments and j 

 growths, while what we call deaths are envelopments and / 

 diminutions. 



74. Philosophers have been much perplexed about the 

 origin of forms 116 , entelechies, or souls; but nowadays 



past, if I had even to be taught anew my own name and how to 

 read and write, I could always learn from other people my life in, 

 former times, just as I should still retain my rights, so that it would 

 not be necessary to divide me into two people and to make me mjr 

 own heir. No more is required to maintain the moral identity, which 

 constitutes the same person' (loc. dk, 9 ; E. 280 b; G. v. 219). 

 'An immaterial being or a mind [esprit] cannot le deprived of all 

 perception of its past existence. It retains impressions of all that 

 has formerly happened to it ; but these feelings are usually too 

 small to be capable of being distinguished and of being consciously 

 perceived, although they may perhaps be developed some day. 

 This continuing and connexion t)f perceptions makes the being really 

 the same individual, but apperceptions that is to say, when one is 

 conscious \s' aperyoit] of past feelings prove also a moral identity 

 and make the real identity apparent ' (toe. tit., 14 ; E. 281 b ; 

 G. v. 222). Cf. New Essays, Introduction, p. 373. 



115 A soul without body (in the sense of materia secunda} would be 

 a soul without any relation to other Monads. For a compound 

 substance (i. e. soul and body) consists ultimately in the relation 

 of a dominant Monad to subordinate Monads. l Creatures free or 

 freed from matter would at the same time be separated from the- 

 universal connexion of things, and, as it were, deserters from the 

 general order.' Considerations sur les Principes de Vie (1705) (E. 432 b ; 

 G. vi. 546). Again, a soul without body (in the sense of materia prima) 

 would be a Monad without passivity or confused perception, i. e. it 

 would be actus purus or God. Kirchmann (Erlauterungen zu Leibniz* 

 Schriften) dismisses Leibniz's statement as ' a mere assertion, which 

 indeed does not necessarily follow from Leibniz's own principles/ 

 The difficulty is the same as that mentioned in note in. 



116 The form is the life or vital principle in any organic being. 

 Cf. Lettre a Arnauld (1687) (G. ii. 116) : 'I proceed to the question 

 of forms or souls, which I hold to be indivisible and indestructible. 

 Parmenides (of whom Plato speaks with veneration), as well as 

 Melissus, maintained that there is no generation nor corruption 



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