THE MONADOLOGY 261 



body was already there before conception, but also a soul 

 in this body, and, in short, the animal itself ; and that by 

 means of conception this animal has merely been prepared 

 for the great transformation involved in its becoming an 

 animal of another kind. Something like this is indeed 

 seen apart from birth [generation], as when worms become 

 flies and caterpillars become butterflies. (Theod. 86, 89. 

 Pref. [E. 475b; G. vi. 4osqq.]; 90, 187, 188, 403, 86, 397.) 



75. The animals, of which some are raised by means of 

 conception to the rank of larger animals, may be called 

 spermatic, but those among them which are not so raised 

 but remain in their own kind (that is, the majority) are 

 born, multiply, and are destroyed 118 like the large animals, 

 and it is only a few chosen ones [elus] that pass to a greater 

 theatre. 



76. But this is only half of the truth 119 , and accordingly 



man, Problems of Biology, p. 92. While rejecting traduction in its 

 ordinary form, Leibniz recognizes its affinity to his own view, which 

 he describes as ' a kind of traduction, more satisfactory [traitable] 

 than that which is commonly taught.' Theodicee, 397 (E. 618 b ; 

 G. vi. 352). 



118 According to Leibniz, they are not entirely, but only ap- 

 parently destroyed. The statement is made in the form in which 

 scientific observers of Leibniz's time would have put it, and it is 

 subject to the qualification made in 76. Leibniz's point is that, 

 just as there is a visible world of larger organisms, so there is 

 a microscopic world of spermatozoa, undergoing in miniature all 

 the changes which take place in the larger visible world. The 

 larger organisms of the visible world are certain elect members of 

 the spermatic world which, ' by means of conception,' have been 

 enabled to grow from microscopic minuteness to visibility. 



119 The scientific observers have only stated half of the truth ; 

 but Leibniz thinks that they would have no objection to the other 

 half. '1 think that if this opinion had occurred to them, they 

 would not have found it absurd, and there is nothing more natural 

 than to believe that what does not begin does not perish.' Lettre a 

 Arnauld (1687) (G. ii. 123). Cf. Plato, Phaedrus, 245 D : 'ETTfiSfj 8i 

 ayevijTov tart, KOI a8ta<pOopov avro avdyrcrj ftvai. Leibniz elsewhere 

 speaks of the view of Plato ' that the object of wisdom is ra ovrcas 

 ovra, that is, simple substances, which are called by me ' [Leibniz] 

 4 Monads, and which once existing always continue to exist, -npura 

 SfKTiKa rfjs fays, that is, God and souls, and of these the chief are 



