266 THE MONADOLOGY 



83. Among other differences which exist between 

 ordinary souls and minds [esprits], some of which 

 differences I have already noted lsl , there is also this : 

 that souls in general are living mirrors or images of the 

 universe of created things, but that minds are also images 

 of the Deity or Author of nature Himself, capable of 

 knowing the system of the universe m , and to some 

 extent of imitating it through architectonic ensamples 

 \echantillons 133 ], each mind being like a small divinity in 

 its own sphere. (Theod. i47.)_ 



84. It is this that enables spirits [or minds esprits] to 

 enter into a kind of fellowship with God, and brings it 

 about that in relation to them He is not only what an 

 inventor is to his machine (which is the relation of God 

 to other created things), but also what a prince is to his 

 subjects, and, indeed, what a father is to his children 134 . 



main principles, it ought to be impossible to draw a sharp line 

 between these two classes of souls. Yet, while not regarding as 

 absolute the distinction between the rational and the merely sen- 

 suous, Leibniz is afraid of minimizing this distinction and of thus 

 putting in jeopardy the pre-eminence of man and the immortality 

 of the soul. In the draft of a letter to Arnauld (1686) he speaks of 

 this question as 'a. special point [une particular tie] about which 

 I have not light enough ' (G. ii. 73). Cf. Introduction, Part iii. 

 p. 116. 



131 19-30. 



132 'The difference between intelligent substances and those which 

 are not so, is as great as the difference there is between a mirror 

 and him who looks therein/ Paper without a title (1686) (G. iv. 

 46o). 



133 That is, subsidiary creations or imitative constructions. Man 

 can not merely express in himself the ' machine ' of the universe, 

 but he can also make for himself small ' machines,' constructed on 

 similar principles. Cf. 64 ; also Principles of Nature and of Grace, 

 14. An dpxiTtKTcav is literally a 'master of works.' 



134 ' Concerning the human soul I dare not assert anything as to 

 its origin nor as to its state after death, because rational or intelli- 

 gent souls, such as ours is, having been so fashioned that they have 

 a peculiar relation to the image of God, are governed by very dif- 

 ferent laws from those to which souls without understanding are 

 subject.' Epistola ad Bernoullium (1699) (G. Math. iii. 565). Spirits 

 [esprits} alone are made in His image, and are, as it were, of His 



