THE MONADOLOGY 271 



stand the order of the universe, we should find that it 

 exceeds all the desires of the wisest men, and that it is 

 impossible to make it better than it is U4 , not only as a 

 whole and in general but also for ourselves in particular, 

 if we are attached, as we ought to be, to the Author of 

 all, not only as to the architect and efficient cause of our 

 being, but as to our master and to the final cause, which 

 ought to be the whole aim of our will, and which can 

 alone make our happiness. (Theod. 134, 278. Pref. [E. 

 469 ; G. vi. 27, 28].) 



conatum}) otherwise it would never fail to produce its full effect, 

 since God is master of all things. Complete and infallible success 

 belongs only to consequent will, as it is called. It is complete, and 

 this rule applies to it, namely, that we never fail to do what we 

 will, when we can. Now this consequent, final and decisive will 

 results from the conflict of all the antecedent volitions [' wills H, 

 both those which tend towards good and those which oppose evil, 

 and it is from the concurrence of all these particular volitions 

 that the total volition comes : as in mechanics the composite 

 motion is the result of all the tendencies which concur in one and 

 the same movable body, and equally satisfies each of them so far 

 as it is possible to do so at once. ... In this sense it may be said 

 that antecedent will [volition] is in a way efficacious and even 

 effective and successful. From this it follows that God wills 

 antecedently the good, and consequently the best.' Theodicee, 22 and 

 23 (E. 510 b; G. vi. 115, 116). God antecedently wills the absolute 

 good of all beings ; but He consequently wills the greatest good of 

 each that is possible, considering the essential limitations of their 

 natures and their relations to one another in the system of things. 

 This greatest possible good is thus compatible with a certain amount 

 of evil. 



14t This is not to be taken as meaning that it is impossible to 

 make the world better than it is at this or any particular moment of 

 time. Leibniz is speaking of the world as a system including all 

 time, and accordingly he does not exclude progress in time. 



