272 THE MONADOLOGY 



APPENDIX F. 



THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN LEIBNIZ AND BAYLE REGARDING 

 THE MULTIPLICITY IN THE MONAD. 



THE ' difficulty ' regarding the possibility of a multiplicity in 

 the Monad, to which Leibniz refers in 16 of the Monadology, 

 is variously expressed by Bayle in his Dictionary (article 'Rora- 

 rius '). He says : 'As Leibniz with much reason supposes that 

 all souls are simple and indivisible, it is impossible to under- 

 stand how they can be likened to a clock ' [see Third explana- 

 tion of the New System, and Introduction, Part ii. p. 45], ' that is 

 to say, how by their original constitution they can diversify 

 their operations, by means of the spontaneous activity they 

 receive from their Creator. We conceive clearly that a simple 

 being will always act uniformly, if no extraneous cause inter- 

 feres with it. If it were composed of several pieces, like 

 a machine, it would act in divers ways, because the special 

 activity of each piece might change at any moment the course 

 of the activity of the others ; but in an independent simple 

 substance [substance unique], where will you find the cause of 

 any variety in its operation ? ' Leibniz's answer to this appears 

 in the Reponse aux Reflexions de Bayle ; see Monadology, note 20 ; 

 cf. Lettre a Bosnage (1698) (E. 153 a; G. iv. 522) : ' I compared 

 the soul to a clock, only as regards the regulated precision of 

 its changes. This is but imperfect in the best of clocks, but it 

 is perfect in the works of God. And the soul may be said to be 

 an immaterial automaton of the very best kind. When it is 

 said that a simple being will always act uniformly, a distinction 

 must be rrade : if acting uniformly means constantly following 

 the same law of order or varying succession \ continuation], as in 

 a certain order or series of numbers, I admit that of itself every 

 simple being, and even every compound being, acts uniformly ; 

 but if uniformly means exactly in the same way [semblablement], 

 I do not admit it. . . . The soul, though it is perfectly simple, 

 has always a feeling [sentiment] composed of several perceptions 

 at once ; and this is as much to our purpose as if it were com- 

 posed of pieces, like a machine. For each preceding perception 

 influences those which follow, according to a law which there 

 is in perceptions as in motions.' Bayle allows that Leibniz's 

 view contains the promise of a theory which will solve all diffi- 



