ON THE NOTIONS OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE 283 



which are contrary to good morals [contra bonos mores] R . 

 Further, a good man is one who loves all men, so far as 

 reason allows 4 . Justice 5 , therefore, which is the virtue 6 

 governing that disposition of mind [affectus] which the 

 Greeks call <iAai/0/o<o7ria, will, if I mistake not, be most 

 fittingly defined as the charity of the wise man [caritas 

 sapientis 1 ^ that is to say, charity in obedience to the 



3 * When the nature of justice and (as is necessarily involved 

 in this) the nature of wisdom and charity is understood, it is 

 manifest that that which to a good man is possible, impossible, 

 necessary (if he wishes to retain the name), is just or permissible, 

 unjust, and finally, obligatory [debitum~\. For it is not to be believed 

 that we are capable of doing things which are contrary to good 

 morals, and in this sense it may be said that the right we have 

 of acting or not acting is a certain power or moral liberty, while 

 obligation is a necessity.' De tribus juris naturae et gentium gradibus 

 (Mollat, p. 13). 



* ' He who loves God, that is he who is wise, will love all men, 

 but each in proportion as the traces of divine virtue in him shine 

 out, and in proportion as he hopes to find in him a companion 

 ready and able to promote the common good, or (what comes to 

 the same thing) the glory of God, the Giver of good things,' loc. cit. 



4 The doctrine of Eight must, according to Leibniz, be deduced 

 from definitions, for the idea of justice is a priori. l Since justice 

 consists in a certain congruity and proportion, the just may have 

 a meaning, although there may neither be any one who practises 

 justice nor any one towards whom it is practised, just as the ratios 

 of numbers are true, although there may neither be any one who 

 numbers nor anything which is numbered, and it may be predicted 

 of a house that it will be beautiful, of a machine that it will be 

 effective, of a commonwealth that it will be happy, if it comes into 

 existence, although it may never come into existence.' Juris et 

 aequi elementa (Mollat, p. 24). I have in most places translated the 

 word 'jus' by 'Eight.' Regarding the ambiguities of these words 

 see E.G. Clark's Practical Jurisprudence, ch. 2 and 6. 



6 ' All virtue is the bridling of the desires [affectus] so that 

 nothing can oppose the commands of right reason.' Juris et aequi 

 elementa (Mollat, p. 26). Cf. G. vii. 92 sqq. 



7 Leibniz gives various longer definitions of justice. In a letter 

 to Kesner (1709) (Dutens, iv. 261) he says : 'Justice is perfection 

 in accordance with wisdom, so far as concerns a person's conduct 

 in relation to the goods and ills of other persons.' Again, ' Justice 

 is nothing but that which is in conformity with wisdom and 

 goodness combined ; the end of goodness is the greatest good, but 



