284 ON THE NOTIONS OF EIGHT AND JUSTICE 



dictates of wisdom 8 . Therefore the saying attributed to 

 Carneades 9 that justice is supreme folly, because it bids us 

 attend to the interests of others, neglecting our own, pro- 

 ceeds from ignorance of the definition of justice 10 . Charity 

 is universal benevolence, and benevolence is the habit of 

 loving or esteeming [amandi sive diligendi] u . But to love 



in order to recognize it we require wisdom, which is nothing but 

 the knowledge of the good. . . . Wisdom is in the understanding 

 and goodness in the will. And justice consequently is in both.' 

 Meditation sur la notion commune de la justice (Mollat, p. 62). 'The 

 true and perfect definition of justice is the habit of loving others 

 or of taking pleasure in the thought of other people's good, as often 

 as it comes into consideration.' ' Justice is prudence in bringing 

 about the good of others or not bringing evil upon them for the 

 sake of bringing about one's own good (by thus manifesting one's 

 mind), or not bringing evil upon oneself (that is, for the sake of 

 gaining reward or avoiding punishment).' Juris et aequi elementa 

 (Mollat, pp. 32 and 35). Eegarding the last statement, it should 

 be remarked that Leibniz says : ' God Himself is the reward,' 

 toe. tit. 



8 ' . . . even in those who have not attained to this wisdom. For, 

 setting God apart, the majority of those who would act in 

 accordance with justice in all things, even against their own 

 interests, would in fact do what is required by th^ wise man who 

 finds his pleasure in the general good, but in certain cases they 

 would not themselves act as wise men, not being sensitive to the 

 pleasure of virtue.' Meditation sur la notion commune de la justice 

 (Mollat, p. 75). 



9 The saying comes from the Epitome of the Dimnae Institutiones 

 of Lactantius, ch. i. Cf. Instit. v. 14 and Cicero, De Eep. iii. 23 

 (Ritter and Preller, Hist. Phil. Graec. 436 and 438). Carneades 

 (about 213-129 B.C.), a native of Gyrene, was founder of the New 

 Academy. In 1566.0. he visited Rome as an ambassador from 

 Athens and caused much astonishment by his skill in arguing 

 successively for and against justice. Cf. Grotius, De jure belli et 

 pads, Prolegomena, 5. 



10 ' There cannot be justice without prudence, nor can prudence 

 be separated from one's own good/ Juris et aequi elementa (Mollat, 

 p. 26). 



11 ' There are two ways of desiring the good of others, the one 

 when we desire it on account of our own good, the other when 

 we desire it as if it were our own good. The first is the way 

 of him who esteems, the second of him who loves ; the first is 

 the feeling of a master to his servant, the second that of a father 

 to his son ; the first is the feeling of a man towards the tool he 



