ON THE NOTIONS OF EIGHT AND JUSTICE 285 



or esteem is to take pleasure in the happiness of another, 

 or what comes to the same thing, to adopt another's happi- 

 ness as our own. In this way there is solved the difficult 

 problem, which is also of great importance in theology, how 

 there can be a disinterested love [amor non mercenarius] 12 , 

 a love apart from hope and fear and every consideration 

 of advantage ; the solution being that the happiness of 

 those in whose happiness we take pleasure becomes a part 

 of our own happiness 13 , for things which give us pleasure 

 are desired for their own sakes u . And as the very con- 

 requires, the second that of friend to friend ; in the first case the 

 good of others is sought for the sake of something else, in the 

 second for its own sake/ Juris et aequi elementa (Mollat, p. 30). 

 In this note the word translated ' esteem ' is aestimare, while in 

 the text it is diligere. Benevolence is a fis in the Aristotelian 

 sense, l not an act, but a habit or strong inclination of the mind, 

 which we have acquired either by the fortune of birth, or by 

 a special gift of God, or by repeated practice/ De justitia (Mollat, 



P- 37). 



12 Cf. Monadology, 90, note 142. In the Preface to the second 

 part of the Codex Juris Gentium Diplomatics, 10 (Dutens, iv. 313), 

 Leibniz replies to those who objected to his solution on the ground 

 that ' it is more perfect to cast oneself entirely upon God, so as 

 to be moved by His will alone and not by one's own pleasure/ 

 This, says Leibniz, * is contrary to the nature of things : for the 

 endeavour to act springs from a tendency to perfection, the feeling 

 of which is pleasure ; and there is no action or volition otherwise/ 

 Cf. a paper on the views of Fenelon (1697) (E. 790 a ; G. ii. 578) : 

 ' We do everything for our own good, and it is impossible for us to 

 have other opinions, although we can speak about others. But 

 nevertheless, we do not yet love quite purely, when we do not 

 seek the good of the loved object for its own sake and because 

 it pleases us in itself, but because of some advantage which comes 

 to us from it. But . . . we seek at once our own good for our own 

 sakes and the good of the loved object for its own sake, when the 

 good of this object is immediately, finally (ultimata) and by itself 

 our aim, our pleasure and our good, as happens with regard to all 

 the things which we desire because they please us in themselves 

 and are consequently good in themselves without regard to conse- 

 quences : they are ends, not means.' 



13 ' The prerogative of true happiness is that it is increased by 

 the multitude of those who share it/ De justitia (Mollat, p. 4 1 )- 



14 This is a convertible statement. 'Everything pleasant is 



