ON THE NOTIONS OF EIGHT AND JUSTICE 289 



The higher degree I call equity, or if you prefer it, 

 charity (that is, in the narrower sense), which I extend 

 beyond the rigour of bare Eight to those obligations also 

 on account of which those to whom we are obliged have 

 no ground of action to compel us to perform them, such 

 as gratitude, pity, and the things which are said by Grotius 

 to have imperfect right [or fitness, aptitudo] not right 

 proper [facultas]. And as the precept of the lowest degree 

 was to do injury to no one, so that of the middle degree 

 is to do good to everybody 80 ; but that so far as befits 

 each person or so far as each deserves, since we cannot 

 equally befriend all men 31 . Therefore to this place belong 

 distributive justice 32 and that precept of Eight [jus] 

 which bids us give to each his own. And to this political 

 laws in the state are related, laws which have to do with 

 the happiness of subjects and which usually bring it about 

 that those who had only moral claim [aptitudo] acquire 

 a jural claim [facultas] 33 , that is to say, that they are 



with 'moral claim' (aptitudo). 'Commutative justice' (justitia ex- 

 pletrix) concerns facultas, while 'distributive justice' (justitia attri- 

 butrix) concerns aptitudo. 



29 This degree of Eight presupposes some sort of ' society ' or 

 social arrangement among men. There may be such a ' society' in 

 which the first degree of Eight is alone recognized, but it cannot 

 be a happy state, for there must be ' perpetual quarrels' in it, and 

 thus the higher degree of Eight comes to be recognized. De tribus 

 juris naturae et gentium gradibus (Mollat, pp. 17 sqq.)- 



30 ' Do not do to others what you do not wish to be done to your- 

 self, and do not deny to others what you wish to be done to yourself. 

 It is the rule of reason, and it is our Lord's rule. Put yourself in 

 the place of others and you will be at the true point of view for 

 judging what is just or not.' Meditation sur la notion commune de la 

 justice (Mollat, p. 70). 



31 See note 4. 



82 'In which I include contributive justice,' that is, not merely 

 the giving to each his due, but the promoting of the common good 

 and the averting of the common evil. De tribus juris naturae et gentium 

 gradibus (Mollat, p. 16). 



33 The different degrees of Eight are merely degrees, not absolute 

 divisions, and thus one passes into another. Thus to refuse to give 

 a man his due is to injure him, for ' the absence of good is an evil 



U 



