ON THE NOTIONS OF EIGHT AND JUSTICE 291 



itself leads us in business to act upon Eight in the narrow 

 sense [jits strictum], that is, the equality of men, unless 

 when a weighty reason of greater good requires us to 

 depart from it 36 . Moreover, what is called respect of 

 persons has place, not in the exchanging of goods with 

 others, but in the distributing of our own goods or those 

 of the public. 



I have called the highest degree of Eight by the name 

 of uprightness or rather piety 37 . For what has been said 

 so far may be understood in such a way as to be limited 

 to the relations of a mortal life. And indeed bare Eight 

 or Eight in the narrow sense [jus strictum} has its source 

 in the need of keeping the peace; equity or charity 



a6 ' It is not allowable to take from the rich their goods in order 

 to supply the poor with them. . . . Because the disorder which 

 would arise from this would cause more evil and inconvenience in 

 general than the special inconvenience of the present state of 

 things. . . . Thus the state should maintain individuals in their 

 possessions. Yet it may make a tolerable breach in them for the 

 common security, and even for a great common good.' Meditation 

 sur la notion commune de la justice (Mollat, p. 81). 



37 * The third principle of Right is the will of a superior. . . . But 

 the superior is either superior by nature, as God is : and His will 

 again is either natural, hence piety, or law, hence positive Divine 

 Right ; or the superior is superior by agreement [pactum], as a man 

 is ; hence civil Right. Piety therefore is the third degree of natural 

 Right, and it gives perfection and effect to the others. For God, 

 since He is omniscient and wise, confirms bare right and equity ; 

 and, since He is omnipotent, He carries them out. Hence the 

 advantage of the human race, and indeed the beauty and harmony 

 of the world, coincide with the Divine will.' Methodus Nova, &c. 

 (1667), 76 (Dutens, iv. 214). Elsewhere Leibniz argues that 

 there must be a higher degree of right than mere equity, for 

 ' God is supremely just and supremely good,' and the justice of 

 God differs not in kind but in degree from the justice of man. 

 ' But it is not for his ease nor in order to keep the peace with us, 

 that God shows us so much goodness ; for we could not make war 

 upon Him. What, then, will be the principle of His justice and 

 what will be its rule ? It will not be that equity or that equality, 

 which has place among men. . . . We cannot regard God as having 

 any other motive than perfection/ Meditation sur la notion commune 

 de la justice (Mollat, p. 72). 



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