292 ON THE NOTIONS OF RIGHT AND JUSTICE 



strives after something more, to wit that while each to 

 other does as much good as possible, each may increase 

 his own happiness through that of others ; and, to put it 

 in a word, Eight in the narrow sense [jus strictum] avoids 

 misery, Right in the higher sense [jus superius~\ tends to 

 happiness, but of such a kind as falls to our mortal lot. 

 But that we ought to subordinate life itself and whatever 

 makes life desirable to the great good of others so that it 

 behoves us to bear patiently the greatest pains for the sake 

 of others 38 , this is beautifully inculcated by philosophers 

 rather than thoroughly proved by them. For the moral 

 dignity and glory and our soul's feeling of joy on account 

 of virtue, to which philosophers 39 appeal under the name 

 of rectitude, are certainly good things of thought or of the 

 mind, and are indeed great goods, but not such as to pre- 

 vail with all men nor to overcome all the sharpness of 

 evils, since all men are not equally moved by imagination ; 

 especially those who have not become accustomed to the 

 thought of honour or to the appreciation of the good 

 things of the soul, either through a liberal education, or 

 a noble way of living, or the discipline of life or of method. 

 But in order that it may be concluded by a universal 

 demonstration that everything honourable is- beneficial 

 [omne honestum utile] and that everything base is hurtful 

 [omne turpe damnosum] 10 , we must assume the immor- 



38 'The principles of charity are abnegation of self, esteem of 

 others.' Tabulae duae disciplinae juris, &c. (Mollat, p. 9). ' Love feels 

 not the wounds which it suffers, but those which it makes,' loc. cit. 

 p. 12. 'Among true friends all things are common, even to 

 misery.' Juris et aequi elementa (Mollat, p. 33). 



39 ' If you had listened very attentively to Cicero declaiming on 

 behalf of rectitude as against pleasure, you would have heard him 

 magnificently perorate about the beauty of virtue, the deformity 

 of base things, about a conscience at peace with itself in the depth 

 of a rejoicing soul, about the good of an untarnished reputation, 

 about an immortal name and the exultation of glory.' Juris et 

 aequi elementa (Mollat, p. 30). 



40 In his Initium institutionum juris perpetui (Mollat, p. 4) Leibniz, 

 using a similar expression, adds : ' And moral qualities are turned 

 into natural.' Cf. Monadology, 88-90. 



