ON THE NOTIONS OF EIGHT AND JUSTICE 293 



tality of the soul 41 and the Ruler of the universe, GOD 42 . 

 Thus it is that we think of all men as living in the most 

 perfect City [civitas] * 3 , under a Monarch who on account 

 of His wisdom cannot be deceived \_falli\ and on account 

 of His power cannot be avoided 44 ; and a Monarch who is 

 also so loveable that it is happiness to serve such a master. 

 Therefore he who spends his soul for Him gains it, as 

 Christ teaches 45 . By His power and providence it comes 

 to pass that every right passes into fact [omne jus in 

 factum transeat] 46 , that no one is injured except by him- 



41 If the soul were not immortal, Leibniz thinks it would be im- 

 possible for even a wise man to have a sufficient regard for his 

 own perfection. (Mollat, p. 21.) To a similar effect he writes 

 against the view of Puffendorf, of whom he had a very poor 

 opinion. (' He is not much of a lawyer and very little of a 

 philosopher/ Dutens, iv. 261.) Puffendorf limited natural right 

 to external laws and regarded all virtues or moral qualities as 

 based on principles not of reason but of revelation. See Nonita 

 quaedam ad Samuelis Puffendorfii principia (Dutens, iv. 275 sqq., and 

 262). 



4 - Grotius held that ; there would be a certain natural obligation, 

 even if it were granted (which it cannot be) that there is no God.' 

 De jure belli et pacis, Prolegomena, n. ' It is true that Aristotle 

 recognized this universal justice, although he did not refer it to 

 God, and I think it admirable in him to have had, nevertheless, 

 so high an idea of it. But this is due to the fact that for him 

 a well-constituted government or state takes the place of God as 

 regards earthly things, and such a government will do what it can 

 to compel men to be virtuous.' Meditation sur la notion commune de 

 la justice (Mollat, p. 76). 



43 ' Finding, as I do, the principle of justice in the good, Aristotle 

 takes as the rule of expediency [eonvenance] the best, that is to say, 

 what would be expedient for the best government (quod optimae 

 reipublicae conveniret), so that, according to this author, natural 

 right is that which is most expedient for order.' loc. cit. (Mollat, 

 p. 80). Of. Monadology, 85. 



** ' So that the honourable and the advantageous are the same, 

 and no sin is without punishment, no noble deed is in vain or 

 goes without reward.' (Mollat, p. 96.) Cf. Monadologij, 90. 



St. Luke, ix. 24 ; xvii. 33 ; St. John, xii. 25. 



* 6 When power is combined with wisdom and goodness 'it 

 makes right become fact, so that what ought to be really exists, in 

 so far as the nature of things allows. And this is what God does 



