NEW SYSTEM 301 



modifications 12 , of which it is certain that the continuous 

 [continuum] cannot be composed 13 . Accordingly, in order 

 to find these real units [unites] I was constrained to have 

 recourse to a real and animated point, so to speak, or to an 

 atom of substance which must contain some kind of form 

 or active principle, so as to make a complete being u . It 

 was, then, necessary to recall and, as it were, to rehabili- 

 tate the substantial forms 15 , which are so much decried 

 now-a-days, but in a way which renders them intelligible 

 and separates the use to which they should be put from 

 the abuse which they have suffered. I found, then, 

 that the nature of the substantial forms consists in force, 

 and that from this follows something analogous to feeling 

 [sentiment] and desire [appetit] ; and that thus they must 

 be conceived after the manner of the notion we have of 

 souls 16 . But as the soul ought not to be used to explain 

 in detail the structure of the animal's body, I held that 

 similarly these forms must not be used to solve the par- 

 ticular problems of nature, although they are necessary 

 for establishing true general principles 17 . Aristotle calls 

 them first entelechies. I call them (in a way that may 



12 That is, not independent beings, but properties or relations, 

 like the two ends of a stick. 



13 E. reads : l quite other than the points of which it is cer- 

 tain,' &c. See Prefatory Note. 



14 E. reads : ' I was constrained to have recourse to a formal 

 atom, since a material being cannot be at once material and 

 perfectly indivisible or possessed of a genuine unity/ 



15 Substantial forms as distinct from accidental forms, the former 

 being used to explain substances, the latter to explain their 

 accidents. 



16 The transition from point to point is here rather rapid. The 

 analogy between desire and force is manifest, but that between 

 feeling and force is more obscure. The essence of feeling, accord- 

 ing to Leibniz, is not consciousness but the representation or 

 concentration of many in one ; and similarly the manifold actions 

 of any substance are ' enveloped ' or potentially contained in its 

 force or vital principle. Cf. Monadology, 13 sqq. 



17 In the First Draft, Leibniz says : ' In my opinion everything 

 in nature takes place mechanically, and to give an exact and 

 complete explanation of any particular phenomenon (such,- for 

 instance, as weight or elasticity), nothing but figure and motion 

 need be used' (G. iv. 472.) 



