334 THIRD EXPLANATION 



upon them, in addition to His general support [con- 

 currence]. 



I do not think that I need offer any further proof 5 

 unless I should be required to prove that God is in 

 a position 6 to make use of this contrivance of foresight, 

 of which we have instances even among men, in pro- 

 portion to the skill they have. And supposing that 

 God is able to make use of this means, it is very evident 

 that this is the best way and the most worthy of Him. 

 It is true that I have also other proofs of it 7 , but they 

 are deeper and it is unnecessaiy to adduce them here 8 . 



Let me say a word about the dispute between two very 

 clever people, the author of the recently-published Prin- 

 ciples of Physics 9 and the author of the Objections 10 (which 

 appeared in the Journal of August 13 and else wh ere \ 

 because my hypothesis serves to bring these controversies 

 to an end. I do not understand how matter can be 



5 It should be observed that Leibniz's argument from analogy 

 proceeds upon the assumption that body and soul, or soul and 

 soul, are in reality quite independent and separate from one 

 another. If this be not admitted his ' proof breaks down : the 

 'three ways' do not exhaust the possible hypotheses. Leibniz 

 seems rather to have prided himself on emphasizing, by his 

 hypothesis, the difference between body and soul. In the post- 

 script to a letter to Basnage de Beauval (1696), part of which is 

 printed as the Second Edaircissement (E. 134 b; G. iv. 499), Leibniz 

 says: 'You had a suspicion that my explanation would be irre- 

 concilable with the great difference which, in our opinion, there 

 is between mind [esprit] and body. But now you see clearly, Sir, 

 that no one has established their independence more completely 

 than I. For since hitherto we have been obliged to explain their 

 inter-relation [communication] by a kind of miracle, we have con- 

 stantly given occasion to many people to fear that the' distinction 

 between mind and body is not so real as people think, since our 

 reasons for maintaining it are so far-fetched. Now all these scruples 



6 The Second Edaircissement reads * is skilful enough.' 

 T The reference is probably to such arguments as those which 

 he afterwards gave in the Monadology. 



8 I have omitted two paragraphs dealing with a purely mathe- 

 matical problem. 



9 Hartsoeker. See New System, 6, note 36. 



10 Foucher. 



