ORIGINATION OF THINGS 339 



sist not in necessitating reasons, that is to say, reasons 

 of an absolute and metaphysical necessity, the opposite 

 of which involves a contradiction 6 , but in inclining 

 reasons. From this it is manifest that even by sup- 

 posing the eternity of the world, we cannot escape the 

 ultimate extramundane reason of things, that is to say, 

 God 7 . 



Accordingly the reasons of the world lie hid in some- 

 thing extramundane, different from the concatenation of 

 states or the series of things, the aggregate of which 

 constitutes the world. And thus we must go beyond 

 the physical or hypothetical necessity, according to which 

 the later things of the world are determined by the 

 earlier, to something which is of absolute or metaphysical 

 necessity 8 , of which a reason cannot be given. For the 

 present world is necessary physically or hypothetically, 

 but not absolutely or metaphysically. That is to say, 

 the nature of the world being such as it is, it follows 

 that things must happen in it just as they do. There- 

 fore, since the ultimate root of all must be in something 

 which has metaphysical necessity, and since the reason 

 of any existing thing is to be found only in an existing 

 thing, it follows that there must exist one Being which 

 has metaphysical necessity, one Being of whose essence 



but a superiority of the good or desirable over the bad or un- 

 desirable in the things which come to pass. The balance or 

 preponderance of goodness inclines the will of God (without 

 absolutely necessitating it) to create these contingent things. 



6 The word contradictionem seems to have been omitted per incuriam. 

 Neither E. nor G. gives it. 



7 Even though the world be taken as eternal, its necessity is 

 not on that account absolute or compelling but merely 'inclining,' 

 and it therefore presupposes some one whose will is 'inclined,' 

 i e. God. 



8 E. reads 'something which is absolute or metaphysical ne- 

 cessity.' Absolute or metaphysical necessity is a necessity that 

 is independent of actual things, in contrast with hypothetical 

 (conditional, relative) or physical necessity, which is the necessity 

 arising out of the .natures of actual things, the necessity which 

 a system of ' compossible ' things imposes on its members. Cf. 

 Introduction, Part ii. p. 67. 



Z 2 



