340 ON THE ULTIMATE 



it is to exist 9 ; and thus there must exist something 

 different from that plurality of beings, the world, which 

 as we admitted and showed, has no metaphysical neces- 

 sity 10 . 



But to explain more distinctly how from eternal or 

 essential or metaphysical truths there arise temporal, 

 contingent or physical truths, we must first observe that, 

 from the very fact that there exists something rather 

 than nothing,-/ it follows that in possible things, or in 

 possibility or essence itself, there is a certain need of 

 existence or, so to speak, a claim to exist, in a word, 

 that essence of itself tends to existence ^ From this it 

 further follows that all possible things, that is, things 

 expressing essence or possible reality, with equal right 

 tend to existence 12 in proportion to the quantity of 

 essence or reality, or in proportion to the degree of per- 

 fection which belongs to them. For perfection is nothing 

 but quantity of essence 13 . 



Hence it is most evident that out of the infinite 

 possible combinations and series of possible things there 

 exists that one through which the greatest amount of 

 essence or possibility is brought into existence. Indeed, 

 there is always in things a principle of determination 

 according to maximum and minimum, so that, for instance, 

 the maximum effect is produced with the minimum out- 

 lay 14 . And the time, the place, or, in a word, the 



9 Cf. Spinoza's distinction between Substance as id quod in se est 

 and Mode as id quod in alio est. Ethics, Part i. deff. 3 and 5. See 

 Monadology, 36 sqq. 



10 For Kant's criticism of the cosmological proof of the existence 

 of God, see Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic, bk. ii. ch. 2, 

 2. Fourth Antinomy. 



" Cf. Monadology, 40, note 64. 



12 Both E. and G. read essentiam, which is manifestly a slip for 

 existentiam. E. corrects the error in his Errata. 



13 Cf. Monadology, 41 and 54. 



H Outlay or cost is in itself loss or limitation. But if there is to 

 be a world at all, there must be loss or limitation, for if the 

 elements of the world were not in different degrees limited, there 

 would be no variety. All would be one ' splendidly null ' perfec- 

 tion. Yet the world is the best possible world in the sense that it 



