3-j 8 OX THE ULTIMATE 



who has not tasted bitter things does not deserve sweet 

 things and, indeed, will not appreciate them. This 

 is the very law of enjoyment, that pleasure does not 

 have an even tenor, for this begets loathing and makes 

 us dull, not happy 36 . 



But as to our saying that a part may be disturbed 

 without destroying harmony in the whole, this must not 

 be understood as meaning that no account is taken of the 

 parts or that it is enough for the world as a whole to be 

 perfect, although it may be that the human race is 

 wretched, and that there is in the universe no regard 

 for justice and no care for us, as is the opinion of some 

 whose judgment regarding the totality of things is 

 not quite just. For it is to be observed that, as in 

 a thoroughly well-constituted commonwealth care is 

 taken, as far as may be, for the good of individuals, 

 so the universe will not be sufficiently perfect unless 

 the interests of individuals are attended to, while the 

 universal harmony is preserved 37 . And for this no 



36 'To have a thousand well-bound Virgils in your library, always 

 to sing airs from the opera of Cadmus and Hermioiie, to break all 

 your porcelain that you might have nothing but cups of gold, to 

 have diamonds alone for buttons, to eat nothing but partridges, 

 to drink only Hungarian or Shiras wine would you call that 

 reason?' Theodicee, 124 (E. 539 b ; G. vi. 179). Cf. Principles of 

 Nature and of Grace, 18 ; also Bacon, De Augmenlis, iii. i. 



37 Cf. Theodicee, 118 (E. 535 a ; G. vi. 169): 'No substance is 

 absolutely contemptible or precious in the sight of God. ... It 

 is certain that God gives more importance to a man than to 

 a lion ; yet I do not know if we can be certain that God prefers 

 one man to the whole species of lions in all respects. But even if 

 it were so, it would not follow that the interest of a certain number 

 of men should prevail in face of a general disorder, extending to an 

 infinite number of created things. This opinion would be a relic 

 of the old maxim, now quite out of repute,, that everything happens 

 solely on man's account.' Cf. Meditation sur la notion commune de la 

 justice (Mollat, p. 63) : 'There are people who think that we are of 

 too little consequence, in the sight of an infinite God, for Him to 

 have any care for us : we are supposed to be in relation to God 

 what the worms, which we crush without thinking about it, are in 

 relation to us. But this is to suppose that God is like a man and 

 cannot think of everything. Just because God is infinite, He does 

 things without labour by a kind of consequence of His will,- as it is 

 a consequence of my will and that of my friend that we are in 



