35^ NEW ESSAYS 



leisure time. Accordingly Leibniz, in view of publication, 

 submitted his work to Hugony and Barbeyrac (the great jurist), 

 who revised a considerable portion of it, including the Intro- 

 duction, and made numerous changes in its expression. 

 Meanwhile a new edition of Coste's translation, revised and 

 corrected by Locke himself, was promised, and Leibniz was 

 strongly advised by Coste to delay publication until after he 

 had seen this new edition. Locke died in the end of 1 704, and 

 Leibniz, understanding that he had made considerable changes 

 in his .opinions, felt that it was now of little use to publish his 

 own criticism. 



Accordingly the New Essays remained in manuscript until 

 1765, when they were published by Raspe. He printed the text 

 in the form which it had finally assumed after the correction 

 and revision of Hugony, Barbeyrac and Leibniz himself. 

 Erclmann (E. 194 sqq.) follows this text. Gerhardt (G. v. 39 

 sqq.), however, has thought it better to reconstruct the original 

 text, by going behind the corrections, on the ground that, 

 while these corrections often improve the French style of the 

 original, they do not always so well express Leibniz's thought. 

 Boutroux, approving the course taken by Gerhardt, has in 

 various points corrected the text made by that editor. My 

 translation is made from Boutroux's text. Such variations as 

 involve a change in translation are mentioned in foot-notes. 



In the Introduction to the New Essays (which was written 

 later than the rest of the book), Leibniz summarizes the main 

 points regarding which he differs from Locke, while he 

 characteristically suggests that, after all, the differences 

 between his view and that of Locke are not altogether in- 

 surmountable. After some prefatory sentences, the Intro- 

 duction deals in the first place (a) with the question whether 

 (as Locke held) the mind is tabula rasa or whether (as Leibniz 

 thought) there are innate ideas, necessary truths, including 

 the question whether or not all our knowledge comes from the 

 senses (pp. 357-367). (V) This leads naturally to the question 

 whether (as Locke seems to say) there is nothing in our mind 

 of which we are not actually conscious or whether (as Leibniz 

 maintains) we have unconscious perceptions (pp. 367-385). 

 Leibniz here connects his psychology with his metaphysics by 

 showing how the petites perceptions throw light upon the pre- 

 established harmony, the law of continuity, the identity of 



